

MASTER IN ANTI-CORRUPTION STUDIES PROGRAMME

The Influence of Incentive Structures on Collective Action

The Case of Anti-Corruption Collective Action in Malawi

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Abstract

This study examines the questions: *Do incentive structures significantly influence stakeholders' participation in collective action and to what extent do incentives account for the success or failure of collective action?* The study used a mixed research approach involving qualitative and quantitative methods. Four anti-corruption collective action organizations were selected using purposive sampling. Stakeholders, organizers and key informants from these organizations were interviewed using a structured questionnaire. The aim is to assess the different types of incentives their organizations offer and whether they influenced stakeholder participation as well as success or failure and sustainability of the organizations. The study found that the anti-corruption collective action organizations have credible incentive structures which are diverse. These incentives structures substantially influence stakeholder's participation as well as the success and sustainability of the collective action efforts. However, they do not account for the failure of these efforts. The results also show that other factors besides incentives exert some influence on stakeholder participation as well as success or failure and sustainability. Despite finding that the collective action organizations were a success, they also had challenges to effectively ascertain the impact of their efforts. The study has concluded that incentives cannot exclusively guarantee long-term sustainability of anti-corruption collective efforts despite the significant role they play. This is due to the influence of other factors in determining sustainability of anti-corruption collective action efforts.

Key Words

Incentive structures, influence, participation, stakeholder, anti-corruption, collective action, Malawi

List of Abbreviations

BAAC	Business Action Against Corruption
COSTI	Construction Sector Transparency Initiative
EITI	Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
IACCWC	Inter-Agency Committee for Combating Wildlife Crimes
NACS	National Anti-Corruption Strategy
NIC	National Integrity Committee
NIP	National Integrity Platform
UN	United Nations

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

This chapter introduces the study. It explains the rationale behind the study and also highlights the key research question and objectives which it sets out to address. It concludes with a synopsis of the structure of this thesis.

1.2. Background

Collective action is one of the commonly used approaches in a variety of disciplines for tackling issues that particularly require multi-sectoral collaboration. These include social, economic, developmental, political and environmental sectors to cite a few. In anti-corruption, collective action is essential, particularly in environments which have a high prevalence of corruption coupled with weak law enforcement capacity.¹ Collective action can occur at a formal or informal level.

The last decade has witnessed an increase in the use of anti-corruption collective action, particularly on the African continent. The United Nations (UN) Global Compact program, established in 2000, and other similar local,

¹ The World Bank Institute, *Fighting corruption through collective action: A business guide*, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008, 11, accessed Sept 11, 2016, https://www.globalcompact.de/wAssets/docs/Korruptionspraevention/Publikationen/fighting_corruption_through_collective_action.pdf.

national and regional efforts which promote anti-corruption collective action, reflect its growing usage as a tool for addressing corruption.

This study intends to examine the role which incentives and incentive structures play in anti-corruption collective action organizations. Specifically, it seeks to explore whether incentive structures influence stakeholder's decision to participate in the anti-corruption collective action. It further intends to ascertain the extent to which existing incentive structures influence success or failure and sustainability of anti-corruption collective action organizations.

1.3. Overview of the corruption situation in Malawi

Malawi has significant levels of corruption. This is evidenced, among others, by its poor ranking on several global and regional indices.² The 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index, for instance, ranked Malawi 120.³ The Afro-Barometer Survey and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance depict a similar picture.⁴ Locally, the Governance and Corruption survey of 2013 ranked corruption as the second most significant obstacle to socio-economic

² World Justice Project, *Rule of Law Index*, Washington, DC: World Justice Project, 2015, 6, accessed March 4, 2017, https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/roli_2015_0.pdf.

³ Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index 2017*, accessed March 4, 2017, http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017.

⁴ Afro-Barometer, *Malawi Round 6 data (2014)*, accessed March 4, 2017, <http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/malawi-round-6-data-2014>; Mo Ibrahim Foundation, *2017 Ibrahim Index of African Governance*, accessed Sept 5, 2017, <http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf>.

development. Most citizens (96%) interviewed in the survey, described it as a severe problem and 64% of the businesses indicated that it is common to pay a bribe.⁵

Analysis by Transparency International singles out administrative and political corruption as the preponderant variants of corruption plaguing Malawi.⁶ These variants pervade most public service delivery areas, ranging from the police service, road traffic services, public health facilities, registry and permit services, customs, to the judiciary, amongst other areas. Public procurement has also been singled out as one of the most serious corruption-prone areas for political corruption.⁷ The prevalence of corruption has had negative and detrimental consequences. It has also resulted in entrenching a system of patronage.⁸

1.4. Efforts to address corruption in Malawi

Malawi's anti-corruption efforts began in 1995. This was after Malawi had transitioned to a multiparty democracy set up from a one-party dictatorship in 1992. The first tangible step that was taken was the promulgation of the Corrupt Practices Act which provided the legal and

⁵ Blessings Chinsinga et al., *Governance and corruption survey*, Centre for Social Research, University of Malawi, 2013, 8.

⁶ Transparency International, *Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Malawi*, accessed Sept 11, 2017, https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/overview_of_corruption_and_anti_corruption_in_malawi.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

institutional framework to facilitate efforts to address corruption.⁹ The first decade of anti-corruption efforts was characterized by a prioritization of traditional and legal-based approaches to dealing with corruption. Much emphasis was placed on enforcement.

The expectation was that emphasis on investigations and prosecutions would maximize deterrence and reduce corruption levels. However, as the indices show, this was not realised. Later, after that first decade, other initiatives proliferated as part of attempts to complement the traditional means that had dominated anti-corruption efforts.

1.5. Attempts at collective action as an anti-corruption approach

The first anti-corruption collective action attempts occurred around 2005. They involved the establishment of the Business Action Against Corruption (BAAC). This was mainly a private sector initiative. It was, however, facilitated and hosted by a civil society organization and had some limited public-sector involvement.

A year later, in 2006, the second attempt called the Civil Society Action Against Corruption (CSAAC) was mooted. It was intended to harness civil society efforts and work with Government to address corruption. This initiative, however, did not fully take off.

⁹ The Government of Malawi, *Malawi Corrupt Practices Act No. 17, 2004*, accessed Sept 11, 2017, www.eisourcebook.org/cms/Malawi%20Corrupt%20Practices%20Act.pdf.

These early anti-corruption collective action efforts drew significant impetus from the Malawi Government's declaration of zero-tolerance policy on corruption which was pronounced in May 2004 by the then President, Prof. Bingu wa Mutharika when he assumed office. The collective action efforts peaked in 2009 with the launch of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS). Unlike previous efforts, the strategy emphasized a collaborative approach to tackling corruption.

Crucially, the strategy provided for the establishment of a grand coalition called the National Integrity Committee (NIC). This coalition was set up in 2009 to serve as a multi-stakeholder platform to facilitate collaboration in the implementation of the Strategy (2009-2014). It drew its membership from eight sectors (Executive, Legislature, Judiciary, Private Sector, Faith-based, Media, Civil Society, Traditional Leaders).

The three collective action organizations highlighted above constituted what can be described as the first generation of anti-corruption collective action efforts in Malawi. What distinguished them from those that followed was their exclusive focus on tackling the corruption problem directly and to some extent holistically. They operated with the understanding that corruption was a national problem and they focused largely on contributing their efforts to dealing with it.

However, these efforts did not run their full course as they all faltered before they fully achieved their overall goals. They were viewed to have failed, among other reasons, because the corruption situation continued to worsen. However, this conclusion was primarily based on perception and not backed by any empirically-generated evidence.

A second generation of collective action efforts followed soon. Unlike their predecessors, they did not focus on tackling the problem of corruption directly and holistically. Instead, they focused exclusively on addressing corruption in specific areas. They focussed on the conditions which nurture and facilitate the corruption problem enabling it to thrive in specific sectors or critical functions.

These specific areas included execution of public infrastructure projects where the collective effort focussed on the specific problem of lack of transparency, particularly in procurement for such projects.¹⁰ An example of the collective action organization in this area is the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (COSTI) which started in 2011. Others focussed exclusively on tackling specific problems that may not apparently be corruption related, but in which corruption is one of the primary drivers or influencing factors.

¹⁰ Mulalo Ratshisuka, *Corruption in the construction industry: A quantity surveyor's perspective*, The Hard Hat Professional, April 18, 2017, accessed Aug 18, 2017, <http://www.thhp.co.za/corruption-construction-mulalo>.

These include, for example, illegal wildlife trade and wildlife crimes in general.¹¹ The Interagency Committee for Combating Wildlife Crimes (IACCWC) established in 2014 is a case in point. This generation of collective action organizations is still active.

1.6. Studies on collective action within the region and beyond

There is a dearth of empirical evidence from studies that have exclusively focussed on anti-corruption collective action. Most studies on collective action have been in fields ranging from agriculture, natural resource management, economics to social issues, to mention a few. The recent nature of the anti-corruption collective action may be one of the factors to which the status quo can be attributed.

One of a few studies that exclusively focussed on anti-corruption collective action was done by Johnston and Kpundeh. They focussed on anti-corruption coalition building in Ghana and Bangalore, India. Their study addressed, among other issues, coalition building strategies, sustaining reforms, and the incentives structures.¹²

¹¹ John E. Scanlon, *Corruption and illegal trade in wildlife*, CITES Secretariat, 2015, accessed Aug 18, 2017, https://cites.org/eng/news/sg/cites_sg_presentation_at_the_6th_session_of_the_conference_of_the_parties_to_the_un_convention_against_corruption_03112015.

¹² Michael Johnston and Sahr J. Kpundeh, *Building a clean machine: Anti-corruption coalitions and sustainable reform*, Washington, DC: The World Bank Institute, 2002, iv, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37208.pdf>.

Johnston and Kpundeh also built on Wilson's typologies¹³ on incentive categories which they then applied to the scenarios in Ghana and Bangalore, India which were the subject of their work. However, the scope of their work did not include examining the role which the incentives in the coalitions they looked at played in influencing participation, success or failure and sustainability.

The UN Global Compact program report published in 2007 addressed anti-corruption collective action among other issues. It featured two anti-corruption collective action organizations in Southern Africa, i.e., the BAAC from Malawi and National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF) from South Africa.¹⁴ The report was, however, not preceded by any detailed study. It only profiled these anti-corruption collective action organizations.

The report was followed by another comprehensive publication in 2015. It profiled some of the prominent anti-corruption collective action organizations across the African continent. The study documented interventions which these organizations were undertaking, common challenges they faced and best practices on the use of collective action in Africa to combat corruption, among others.¹⁵

¹³ Johnston and Kpundeh, *Building a clean machine*, iv.

¹⁴ UN Global Compact, Learning Forum, *Business fighting corruption: Experiences from Africa*, Pretoria: UN Global Compact, 2007, iv, https://www.collective-action.com/sites/collective.localhost/files/publications/business_fighting_corruption_-_experiences_from_africa.pdf.

¹⁵ UN Global Compact, *The case for cooperation: Experiences in collective action against corruption in Africa*, New York: UN Global Compact, 2015, 8, <https://www.collective-action.com/publications/1049>.

Despite the reports highlighting some of the incentives which accrued to stakeholders who participated in these organizations, they did not address the extent to which the incentives influenced participation of stakeholders. They did not also examine whether the incentives had influenced success or failure of the collective action organizations they profiled.

Studies on collective action undertaken to date in Malawi have only been in fields ranging from agriculture, economics, to natural resource management. None has exclusively examined anti-corruption collective action. After the first attempts at collective action in anti-corruption collapsed, no empirical effort was undertaken to explore the factors that influenced the collapse of these efforts. In addition, no attempt has been made so far to draw crucial lessons that could inform how best subsequent collective action efforts could be designed to guarantee their sustainability and success.

1.7. The influence of incentives on collective action

One of the central issues in the debate on formation of collective action is the role that incentives play in triggering collective action. Incentives in the collective action context refer to the transactions between members and their collective action organizations which involve an exchange of material or symbolic values for individual resources.¹⁶ These transactions are controlled by the organization. Incentive structures, on the other hand, refer to the

¹⁶ David Knoke, *Organizing for collective action: The political economics of association*, New York: Walter de Gruyter, Inc., 1990, 107.

collection of these incentives or benefits that members access from the collective action organizations in exchange for individual resources.

The term “stakeholders” in the context of this study refers to members of the collective action organization. The concept of incentives in the collective action context is attributed mainly to Mancur Olson who coined it in his theory of collective action.¹⁷ The theory, among other things, attempts to resolve the role that incentives play in influencing the formation of collective action.

In Malawi and countries within the region, there is no empirical study, so far, that has attempted to examine the role which incentives play in practice in the formation, sustenance, success, or failure of anti-corruption collective action efforts. Very little is, therefore, known at the empirical level on the role that incentives play, especially in anti-corruption collective action efforts.

Whilst the UN Global Compact program publications referred to earlier provide some data on collective action organizations that existed during the study, their scope did not address issues such as why the participants joined their respective collective action organizations. Also, they did not examine the role which incentives played in this process or how they influenced success or failure and sustainability of the organizations.

¹⁷ Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965, 51.

Despite the continued existence of the second generation of collective action organizations, there hasn't been an empirical assessment that has attempted to decipher factors that are sustaining them and whether they can be considered a success story compared to their predecessors.

This study, therefore, will attempt to explore the extent to which incentive structures influence stakeholder participation as well as assess whether they explain the success or failure and sustainability of these collective action organizations. The study will address this question by examining four collective action organizations in Malawi, two from the first generation and two from the second generation, i.e., BAAC, NIC, COSTI, and IACCWC.

1.8. Objectives of the study

The main objective of this study is to establish the extent to which incentives offered by anti-corruption collective action organizations influence stakeholder participation and explain the success or failure as well as sustainability of these organizations.

Specifically, the study will seek to:

1. Find out the different types of incentive structures in these collective action organizations

2. Analyse the role which these incentive structures play in motivating participation of various stakeholders in these organizations
3. Ascertain whether collective action organizations were considered to have succeeded (or to be succeeding) or not
4. Determine whether incentive structures influence the success or failure of the organizations
5. Determine whether incentive structures influence the sustainability of collective action organizations.

1.9. Research question

The study will seek to address the following research questions:

Do incentive structures significantly influence stakeholders' participation in collective action and to what extent do flawed incentive structures account for the failure of collective action?

1.10. Research motivation

The primary motivation for doing this research is to address the existing knowledge gap in understanding how incentives influence anti-corruption collective action. Despite the increased use of collective action as a tool for rallying multi-stakeholder efforts in tackling corruption, empirical studies

focussing particularly on the role of incentives on past and existing anti-corruption collective action efforts have not been attempted yet.

The studies could also seek to draw out critical lessons that can continuously inform current and future collective action efforts to make them more effective. Presently, there is no information based on empirical data on what motivates people to join anti-corruption collective action efforts, what sustains these efforts and what influences their success or failure.

In examining the collective action organizations that have been selected, this study will seek to show the extent to which the influence which incentives had on their formation, sustainability, and success or failure relate to what has been postulated by theories in these areas. This will ultimately show the existing gaps between what theory has advanced and the practical realities on these organizations.

The motivation is also to explore whether, besides political and financial factors that are often cited as key contributing factors to the collapse of the anti-corruption collective action organizations, incentives, being key in collective action, have any role in this process. The choice of incentives and incentive structures as the primary focus of this study was motivated by their extensive reference in the theoretical discussions as being essential in collective action efforts.

The motivation is also to generate knowledge and information that would contribute to understanding anti-corruption collective action in Malawi and feed this into the process of developing a new anti-corruption strategy which will span the period 2018-2023. The strategy is expected to build on its predecessor by putting greater emphasis on multi-stakeholder collaboration in fighting corruption through collective action.

The knowledge generated from this study would also play a critical role in informing the design of anti-corruption collective action efforts. It will also help to ensure that collective action can be better leveraged to efficiently augment other anti-corruption interventions within the framework of the new anti-corruption strategy.

1.11. Research hypotheses

The study will seek to test several hypotheses developed based on the research question being explored by this study. The hypotheses will facilitate an in-depth exploration and interpretation of the role that incentive structures play in collective action in Malawi. The hypotheses are as follows:

1.12. Null hypothesis (H_0)

H^0 : Incentive structures have no clear effect on stakeholder's decision to participate in anti-corruption collective action organization. This hypothesis predicts that no causal relationship exists between the variables,

i.e., incentive structures and participation. As such, it hypothesizes that other factors apart from incentives are responsible for influencing stakeholder participation.

1.13. Alternative hypotheses

H¹: Stakeholder's decision to participate in collective action is influenced by the existence of credible incentive structures in the anti-corruption collective action organization. The hypothesis predicts that a causal relationship exists between the two variables, i.e., participation in anti-corruption collective action and incentives.

H²: Successful anti-corruption collective action efforts rely extensively upon a diverse system of incentives. This hypothesis predicts that success of anti-corruption collective action is a direct consequence of diverse incentive structures, i.e., consist of a mix of incentives, e.g. material, purposive and solidarity incentives.

H³: Flawed incentive structures significantly account for the failure of anti-corruption collective action. This hypothesis is the inverse of the hypothesis H². It predicts that where the incentive structures do not appeal to stakeholders participating in the anti-corruption collective action effort, failure will result. It hence hypothesizes that a causal link exists between the

two variables, i.e., flawed incentive structures, on one hand, and failure of anti-corruption collective action, on the other hand.

H⁴ Failure of anti-corruption collective action can still occur even where there is the existence of credible incentive structures. This hypothesis predicts that incentives alone cannot prevent failure of anti-corruption collective action.

H⁵: Purposive incentives, while they make up the core of most anti-corruption collective action organizations, are not likely to be sufficient by themselves. This hypothesis predicts that the anti-corruption collective action organizations cannot just rely on purposive incentives but on other incentive types as well.

1.14. Research variables

The hypotheses outlined above consist of several variables that will form the basis of the study. The incentive structures are an independent variable in this study. This is because they are assumed to be a critical determinant of the success or failure and sustainability of the collective action organizations.

On the other hand, stakeholder participation, success or failure, and sustainability of the collective action initiative are dependent variables. The

behavior observed in these variables is assumed to be directly influenced by the kind of incentive structures in the anti-corruption collective action organization. In the final analysis, the study will determine the relationship that exists between these and each category of the incentive structures.

1.15. Structure of the thesis

The thesis comprises six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the study. It explains the background, objectives, research questions, and the motivation for doing this study.

Chapter 2 outlines a review of some of the relevant literature on the subject. It reviews some of the major collective action theories and scholarly debates on the types of collective action and the role and classifications of incentive structures. It concludes with a discussion of the literature on the success or failure and sustainability of anti-corruption collective action organizations.

Chapter 3 discusses the methodology that has been used in this study. It highlights and discusses the research philosophy, the research design and the strategy that have informed the study. It also discusses how the sample was selected, data collection instruments that were used and how the data was analysed. It concludes by highlighting some of the critical ethical considerations underpinning this study.

Chapter 4 presents the detailed findings of this study. It also addresses the findings in the light of the hypothesis and the research question for this study.

Chapter 5 discusses the findings of the study by relating them to the theoretical framework that was outlined in Chapter 2. It deciphers the trends which the data is showing and interprets the data.

Chapter 6 concludes the study by filtering out some of the key findings that have emerged from this study and proffers some recommendations for consideration based on the lessons from this study. It also suggests areas for possible future research.

1.16. Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the study and provided some background information. It has also presented some key components that will shape the rest of the thesis. The next chapter will discuss and review the literature on the various issues which will be the focus of this study.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

This chapter will review some of the major scholarly discussions on the issues which are the focus of this study. Various sources reviewed include books, peer-reviewed articles, journals, and other publications.

2.2. What Is collective action?

Wheatland and Chêne define collective action as a variety of actions that are undertaken by individuals or groups, or an organization that is acting on their behalf, to achieve a collective purpose or shared interest of the group or individuals.¹⁸ Collective action as a tool is relevant and adaptable to a myriad of contexts and disciplines. It includes economic, political, labor, development, agriculture, environment, social, governance, and anti-corruption, to name a few.

Collective action organizations can operate in a formal, organized and structured way. However, in some contexts they evolve spontaneously and may not assume a well-defined structure. This is principally the case when they are organized to pursue immediate and short-term causes. The

¹⁸ Ben Wheatland and Marie Chêne, *Barriers to collective action against corruption*, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, December 2015, 1, <https://www.u4.no/publications/barriers-to-collective-action-against-corruption/pdf>.

structure and extent of formality of collective action organizations varies from context to context and is influenced by a range of factors.

In some cases, collective action can evolve from already existing networks that are serving different purposes. Vanni, for example, argues that local groups of people who coordinate local action at an informal level to realize defined short-term purposes can sometimes evolve from already existing networks on the ground that pre-dated the collective action that emerges.¹⁹ He also cites community-based organizations and other groups that pursue a range of community issues as other examples. These, he argues, draw their memberships from existing networks to address issues within their communities.²⁰

There is no consensus amongst scholars on how collective action organizations can be categorized. The classifications that exist vary from scholar to scholar and are contextual. In their study, Davies et al., for instance, distinguish two types of collective action organizations. They cite one type as comprising those that involve cooperation and are ordinarily bottom-up collective action. On the other hand, they also discuss collective action that involve coordination at a national or regional level and are usually top-down or agency-led.²¹

¹⁹ Francesco Vanni, *Agriculture and public goods: The role of collective action*, Rome: Istituto Nazionale di Economia Agraria (INEA), 2014, 22, accessed July 4, 2017, http://institutmichelserres.ens-lyon.fr/IMG/pdf/agric_publicgoods_vanni_f_2014-2.pdf.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Vanni, *The role of collective action*, 22.

Davies et al. stated that the former group involves local actors or communities, focussing on localized issues. He further stated that they may also focus on national issues addressed from a local perspective. The latter group is sector driven. The authors argued that in both categories, there may be government involvement or not.²²

The Basel Institute on Governance highlights three variants of collective action organizations associated with anti-corruption efforts.²³ They cite collective action organizations that stem from anti-corruption declarations. These comprise a group of companies, sometimes acting in conjunction with government, which commits not to be involved in acts of corruption but work together to deal with it.²⁴

Secondly, the Basel Institute names standard settings or principles-based collective action. This involves stakeholders, ordinarily from private organizations, who develop and commit to adhering to a code of conduct that is developed to govern a specific industry or sector.

²² Vanni, *The role of collective action*, 22.

²³ Basel Institute on Governance, *Collective Action/ICCA*, accessed Sept 11, 2016, <https://www.baselgovernance.org/theme/icca>.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Lastly, the Basel Institute identifies collective action organizations that take the form of an integrity pact. This is a commitment by participants in a public tender or bidding for big projects not to pay bribes or collude.²⁵

Wheatland and Chêne build on the categorizations advanced by the Basel Institute and cite a fourth variant of collective action. They called it “elite level coalitions.” This takes the form of multi-stakeholder coalitions comprising of civil society, government, and the private sector who share partially overlapping goals.²⁶ This variant exists mostly at the national level.

2.3. Influencing factors for occurrence of collective action

Most of the major theories of collective action have devoted a great deal of attention to explaining the conditions and factors which motivate individuals or groups to collaborate. Arthur Bentley's Group Theory was one of the early theoretical attempts to explain how collective action occurs.

Bentley argues that collective action automatically happens where individuals who have a common purpose and perceive benefits from cooperation come together.²⁷ This theory reflected the early thinking and the widely held view

²⁵ Basel Institute on Governance, *Collective Action/ICCA*.

²⁶ Wheatland and Chêne, *Barriers to collective action*, 2.

²⁷ Sarah Gillinson, *Why cooperate? A multi-disciplinary study of collective action*, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2004, 8, accessed Sept 11, 2016, <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2472.pdf>.

by scholars at that time.²⁸ This view was, however, challenged. Most critics of the Group Theory argue that it does not explain the real cause of collective action beyond the common purpose and perceived benefits from cooperation. It does not, therefore, clarify what causes the spontaneity that results in collective action. They argue that spontaneity is triggered by a range of factors and situations which Group Theory did not endeavour to explain.²⁹

Steinert-Threlkeld, for instance, suggests that spontaneity can arise from decentralized coordination of individuals or centralized, well-coordinated individuals with some leadership driving it.³⁰ He cites a case of protests and argue that it may involve groups or individuals with shared interests aiming to achieve a common goal of, for example, agitating for reforms. These can occur spontaneously. He argues, therefore, that the Group Theory does not clarify what factors combine for this spontaneity to happen.³¹

Other critics argue that by attributing the collective action to a common purpose, the theory still does not explain the transition from common purpose to collective action. They argue that there are situations where

²⁸ Sarah Gillinson, *Why cooperate? A multi-disciplinary study of collective action*, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2004, 8, accessed Sept 11, 2016, <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2472.pdf>.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Zachary C. Steinert-Threlkeld, *Spontaneous collective action: Peripheral mobilization during the Arab Spring*, University of California, 2000, 1, accessed Sept 11, 2016, https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/ictandgov/files/zacharysteiner-threlkeld_spontaneouscollectiveaction_august2015_v6.pdf.

³¹ Ibid.

common purpose may exist but does not automatically result in collective action occurring. Olson, for example, cited large groups such as labour unions where in addition to cooperation and perceived benefits from this cooperation, coercion and selective incentives are used to secure collective action.³²

Despite being criticized, the Group Theory does explain factors that influence the individual to collaborate in some circumstances, but perhaps not in all situations. Some cases of short term, spontaneous collective action, such as industrial action, may fit the pattern explained by the Group Theory, whilst others may not. In conclusion, shared purpose and perception of benefits from cooperating are still critical ingredients for collective action much as they may not in themselves be sufficient to cause a collective action to take off.

Apart from Bentley's Group Theory, Garrett Hardin's seminal work, "*The Tragedy of the Commons*" (1968),³³ had a significant influence on shaping the early theoretical thinking on how collective action develops. This is despite the fact that the work was not offered as a theory per se explaining the formation of collective action. Using an illustration of pasture, he observed that herdsmen sharing a common pasture would be influenced by an unrestrained desire to maximize personal gain that would accrue to

³² Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, 71.

³³ Garrett Hardin, *The Tragedy of the Commons*, Science, New Series, Vol. 162, No. 3859, Santa Barbara: University of California, 1968, http://pages.mtu.edu/~asmayer/rural_sustain/governance/Hardin%201968.pdf.

them.³⁴ He said that when each person pursues their own best interest in a society where they are allowed to operate with unrestrained desire, as is the case with herdsmen in the illustration he gave, it would result in everyone being harmed as it would result in the depletion of shared resources.³⁵ The most significant contribution which Hardin's "*The Tragedy of the Commons*" made to the shaping of the general theoretical framework of collective action, was that it helped the understanding of the problems that often trigger collective action.

Critics, however, argued that what Hardin portrays in his conclusion is what in actual sense influences collective action amongst the individuals to manage the shared resource because cooperation in a situation described by Hardin is not hard to find around the world.³⁶ Rowe cited rice paddies of the Philippines, the Swiss Alpine pasturelands, the Maine lobster fishery, the Pacific haddock fishery, and many other places as examples of cases where competition for resources have led to cooperation to maximize the benefits sustainably, thus defying Hardin's conclusions ³⁷.

³⁴ Hardin, *The Tragedy of the Commons*, 4.

³⁵ Hardin, *The Tragedy of the Commons*, 4.

³⁶ Marq de Villiers, *The fallacy of the tragedy of the commons*, The Daly News, January 29, 2012, accessed Sept 17, 2016, <http://www.steadystate.org/the-fallacy-of-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/>.

³⁷ Jonathan Rowe, *The parallel economy of the commons*, 2008 State of the World-Innovations for a Sustainable Economy, The World Watch Institute, 146, accessed Sept 17, 2016, http://www.worldwatch.org/files/pdf/SOW08_chapter_10.pdf.

Mancur Olson's *The logic of collective action*³⁸ is considered the most influential work that significantly contributed to explaining the circumstances under which collective action would occur. He used the rationality model to challenge the notion by group theorists that collective action automatically occurs where individuals have shared interests and perceive benefits from cooperation. Olson instead argues that shared interest and goals alone, as suggested by group theorists, cannot be sufficient to induce rational, self-interested individuals to collaborate. He argues that where shared purpose exists and individuals can benefit from cooperating, some individuals will be inclined to free ride and leave others to do the heavy lifting where those individuals feel they can still benefit from the results of collective action without incurring costs.³⁹

Olson, therefore, argues that collective action would only occur where benefits are exclusive to active participants. He suggests that collective action must involve selective incentives that reward participants or punish nonparticipants to counter the "free rider" problem.⁴⁰ He further argues that collective action is more likely to take off and succeed when the group is small as opposed to when it is large.⁴¹

Several scholars later challenged Olson's proposition on selective incentives as being key to influencing collective action. Much of the criticism of this

³⁸ Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*.

³⁹ Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, 133.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

theory questions whether selective incentives can lead to the occurrence of a collective action. Frohlich & Oppenheimer, as quoted by Oliver, argue that selective incentives cannot solve the collective action dilemma because they still require someone to pay for them. They, therefore, argue that the process of paying for the selective incentives itself is a form of collective action because it provides a benefit to everyone who is interested in the collective good, not just the ones who just want the incentive, and this can also result in free rider problems.⁴²

Oliver also contends that while selective incentives induce members to participate in collective action, there are other reasons which influence people to join collective action causes in addition to the selective incentives.⁴³ Some scholars have challenged Olson's assertion that selective incentives are what primarily influence collective action. Hardin, as quoted by Oliver and Marwell, argued that Olson's assertion about group size vis-a-vis collective action do not stand up to close technical analysis.⁴⁴ Others have criticized Olson's assertion that collective action is difficult to achieve in larger groups. Based on the research they conducted, Oliver and Marwell

⁴² Pamela E. Oliver, *Rewards and punishments as selective incentives for collective action: Theoretical investigations*, American Sociological Review, vol. 85, no. 6, 1980, 1361, accessed June 30 2017, <https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~oliver/.../Oliver1980AJSRewardsPunishSelectiveIncentive.p>.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Pamela E. Oliver and Gerald Marwell, *The paradox of group size in collective action: A theory of the critical mass*, American Sociological Review, Vol. 53, 1988, accessed June 30, 2017, <https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~oliver/wp/wp-content/.../08/5-paradox-of-group-size.pdf>.

argue that increasing group size heightens the chances of getting a critical mass of participants to get a collective action off the ground.⁴⁵

In conclusion, despite the criticism of Olson's theory, it still represents one of the most significant attempts to explain how collective action occurs. It does explain how it may occur in some circumstances but perhaps not in all cases. Ostrom admits that the theory of collective action is still evolving. She further argued that much more work will be needed to develop the theory for use in policy analysis.⁴⁶

Besides Bentley, Hardin and Olson whose theories have shaped the thinking on how collective action forms, the Prisoner's Dilemma game which has gained broad application in many fields has been vital in illustrating why rational individuals would not always cooperate even when cooperation would be beneficial. The Prisoner's dilemma shows that in certain circumstances, individuals will opt for a course of action that will bring an outcome that benefits the group but when they do not trust each other, each will opt for their best personal outcome which can be worse for the whole group.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Ibid., 3.

⁴⁶ Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action*, Cambridge University Press, 1990, 7.

⁴⁷ Open Learn, *The prisoner's dilemma*, The Open University, accessed Oct 12, 2017, <http://www.open.edu/openlearn/history-the-arts/culture/philosophy/the-prisoners-dilemma>.

Most recent theorists on collective action include other categories of factors that explain what influences people to collaborate. Opp, as quoted by Passy, who belong to the utilitarian paradigm, argue that peer or group pressures may influence individuals to contribute to a collective action.⁴⁸ Chong as quoted by Passy, also of the same paradigm, argued that individuals collaborate in collective action just to enhance their reputation.⁴⁹

There are also scholars that are outside this paradigm. Schlozman, as quoted by Passy, argue that emotions or passion for a cause influence collective action. Other factors suggested for joining collective action include an individual's desire to identify with a group behind the collective action, the value of the public good agitated for by the collective action, and the potential success of collective action initiative.⁵⁰

Most collective action theories are based on the assumption that membership in the collective action organizations is individual-based. The most recent literature on anti-corruption collective action shows an increasing trend and preference for institution-based membership. The UN Global Compact study, for instance, profiled 28 anti-corruption collective action organizations whose membership was primarily institution-based.⁵¹

However, no specific theories have emerged that address this type of

⁴⁸ Florence Passy, *Social and solidary incentives*, University of Lausanne, n.d., 2, accessed Feb 2, 2017, https://serval.unil.ch/resource/serval:BIB_6D442AF3CE80.P001/REF.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ UN Global Compact, 2015, *The case for cooperation: Experiences in collective action against corruption in Africa*, New York: UN Global Compact, <https://www.collective-action.com/publications/1049>.

⁵¹ Passy, *Social and solidary incentives*, 2.

collective action in some detail. Neither do theories or a scholarly discussion exist that have attempted to ascertain whether individuals will act and respond in the same way, regardless as to whether they are representing their interests or interests of their organizations.

2.4. Incentives and their influence on collective action

Group theorists do not address the issue concerning the role that incentives play in collective action. In their view, a collective action automatically occurs where there is common interest and individuals see the benefit of cooperating. Group theorists emphasize common interest and cooperation as being critical influencing factors for triggering collective action.

Olson's theory, on the other hand, is mainly built on the role that incentives play in inducing collective action. He argues that selective incentives, and not incentives in general, are central to inducing collective action. He states that selective incentives overcome the free-rider problem which leads to the failure of most collective action groups, especially large ones, to start well. Oliver defines selective incentives as private goods which are made available

only to participants who contribute to a collective good.⁵² They can either be rewards or punishments.

Olson proposes that since selective incentives are private and exclusive to individual participants, they do not suffer from a free-rider problem. He states that they can hence be used to make participation in collective action more attractive.⁵³ He argues that selective incentives influence a rational individual to act in a group-oriented way.⁵⁴ Implied in this argument is the conclusion that selective incentives play an essential role in fostering collective action.⁵⁵

Olson's pioneering proposition on selective incentives has been criticized. Johnston argues that it is too narrowly focused and does not sufficiently explain why people join collective action.⁵⁶ Passy argues that Olson may have overstated his conclusions because they cannot be generalized to all collective action situations. She further argues that, contrary to what Olson

⁵² Pamela Oliver, *Rewards and punishments as selective incentives for collective action: Theoretical investigations*, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 85, No. 6, 1980, 1361, accessed Feb. 2, 2017, <https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~oliver/PROTESTS/ArticleCopies/Oliver1980AJSRewardsPunishSelectiveIncentive.pdf>.

⁵³ Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, 51.

⁵⁴ Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, 51.

⁵⁵ Michael Johnston, *Why do so many anti-corruption efforts fail?* Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association Annual Conference "Global Governance: Political Authority in Transition," Montreal, Canada, 16-19 March 2011, 474, accessed Feb. 2, 2017, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/07dc/017c8f05a792f3d943996fa001a7731f3580.pdf>.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

concluded, rational individuals will sometimes not participate in collective action despite the presence of selective incentives.⁵⁷

Oliver, basing her conclusions on mathematical modeling, observed that the probability of collective action may in fact increase, decrease or remain constant as group size increases. She further observes that the rationality of collective action varies from situation to situation and depends on several other factors and not just selective incentives.⁵⁸ Oliver argues that incentives may not be the only influencing factor in collective action.

Two schools of thought can be identified from the arguments discussed in the preceding paragraphs on what influences individuals to collaborate. One school argues that collective action automatically happens while the other attributes the collective action to a range of influential factors, the principal key of which is incentives.

There is, therefore, no consensus on which of the factors, or what combination of factors, exert influence on collective action formation and success. The theoretical discussion on factors that influence collective action has primarily been carried out in the context of other fields and disciplines apart from anti-corruption. In the anti-corruption field, the lack of conclusive data based on empirical studies makes this a relatively undiscovered territory.

⁵⁷ Passy, *Social and solidary incentives*, 3.

⁵⁸ Pamela Oliver, *Rewards and punishments*, 1361.

2.5. Classifications of incentives and incentive structures

Few attempts have been made by scholars to propose how different types of incentives and incentive structures can be classified. Some scholars have proposed general categories applicable to a variety of contexts while others have proposed categorizations that are derived from specific studies. The available literature does not include any scholarly debate on this issue. There are, however, propositions by various scholars on how incentive structures can be categorized, though they have not been subjected to any extensive debate or challenged as is the case with the preceding issues discussed.

Wilson was influential in shaping the thinking in this area. He categorized incentives into three types: material incentives, which include tangible rewards such as monetary wages, fringe benefits, and patronage; solidary incentives, which include things such as intangible rewards accrued from the act of association, e.g., status and identification; and lastly, purposive incentives which include intangible rewards related to the goals of the organization.⁵⁹

Based on the data collected from his study, Knoke proposed six different groups of incentive structures: utilitarian incentives, which include, for example, group insurance, travel plans or purchasing opportunities for members; information incentives, which include, for example, data that the

⁵⁹ James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations*, New York: Basic Books, 1973, 33-51.

organization produces for its members; normative incentives, which include tax-deductible contributions for members; lobbying incentives, which include representing members in contract negotiations; occupational incentives, which include, for example, professional contacts and various face to face organizational activities, and finally, social incentives, which include, for instance, social or recreational activities.⁶⁰ Knoke observed that convergence occurred between the goals of the collective action organization and its incentive systems.⁶¹

Apart from these two, Johnston and Kpundeh built on Wilson's work and distinguished two variants of solidarity incentives. The first variant was specific solidarity incentives which, they argued, encompass intangible rewards such as honors and other recognition. The second variant was collective solidarity incentives which encompass intangible rewards enjoyed by a group, such as the prestige of affiliation.⁶²

Other scholars have only given examples of incentive types in anti-corruption collective action. Wheatland and Chene cited some of them as including potential benefits from reduced corruption levels, remuneration or security, prestigious recognition, and a genuine belief that change is possible.⁶³ They cite these as incentives that would influence participation in anti-corruption collective action.

⁶⁰ David Knoke, *Organizing for collective action*, 114-115.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Johnston and Kpundeh, *Building a clean machine*, 9.

⁶³ Wheatland and Chêne, *Barriers to collective action*.

This study, however, will use Clark and Wilson model as the basis for understanding and illustrating the incentives structures and incentive types in the collective action organizations targeted.

2.6. Credible incentive structures vs. flawed incentives structures

There is no theoretical discussion or debate in literature that attempts to define and differentiate credible incentive structures and flawed incentive structures. It cannot be assumed, however, that all incentive structures in a collective action organization are credible and, therefore, attractive to participants. Considering also that incentives are critical to any collective action efforts, differentiating credible and flawed incentives is important to enable debate on the role each type of incentives plays in the functioning of a collective action organization.

No empirical study has been attempted to resolve this issue. In the context of this study, a definition of each of these types of incentives will be suggested. Credible incentive structures are those that stakeholders consider adequate and can, therefore, facilitate getting a collective action effort off the ground and then sustain it as well as influence its success. Flawed incentive structures, on the other hand, are those that fail to achieve these goals.

2.7. Measuring success or failure of collective action efforts

In their paper, Olsen et al. argue that collective action in the anti-corruption discipline provides a handy tool that has a track record of helping reduce corruption and building more competitive markets, particularly in emerging countries.⁶⁴ Despite this assertion, however, measuring the success of anti-corruption collective action has proven to be a challenge. Nero underscores this difficulty by stating:

“The question remains, however, as to how to measure the impact from collective action initiatives, this despite various articulation of its benefits from participating civil society stakeholders and companies, including reputational benefits, increased awareness of anti-corruption internally, and raising standards within an industry. The definition of success itself and methods for measuring it also remain subjects of debate as seen from the practitioners and academic panel discussions.”⁶⁵

The debate on how to ascertain the impact of collective action efforts is inconclusive and still evolving. Several propositions have emerged in this debate. Ruttan, as quoted by Beitzl, for instance, proposes two methods of

⁶⁴ William P. Olsen et al., *The Case for collective action*, Washington, DC: The World Bank Group, 2009, 143.

⁶⁵ William Nero, *Collective action: Evidence, experience, and impact - a recap*, B20 Collective Action Hub, 28 Oct. 2016, accessed Sept. 17, 2017, <https://www.collective-action.com/icarforum/blog/collective-action-evidence-experience-and-impact-recap>.

how the success of collective action can be measured. He suggests that one way would be to use the collective action problem itself or assess the degree to which individuals comply with the set rules or the degree to which they participate in the process of collective action management regimes.⁶⁶

Secondly, he suggests that success can also be measured using the delivery of the collective goods as a basis which assesses the abundance, quality, or general condition of the resource base or institutions for sustainable governance.⁶⁷ Beitzl further suggests that a combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods can measure the parameters suggested by Ruttan.⁶⁸ The challenge with this method, however, is that it may be too complicated and broad. It would hence require expertise which would be a cost to the collective action organization.

Johnston suggests that one of the ways to measure and determine the success or failure of collective action could be whether the collective action efforts take place at all, regardless of its effects.⁶⁹ In environments where corruption is so pervasive and fighting it is complicated and fraught with risks, just setting up a collective action to focus on anti-corruption can be considered a success. Johnston also suggests that another assessment criterion for success of anti-corruption collective action could be whether

⁶⁶ Christine M. Beitzl, *Adding environment to the collective action problem: Individuals, civil society, and the mangrove-fishery commons in Ecuador*, University of Maine, 2014, 9, accessed Sept. 24, 2017, https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=ant_facpub.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Michael Johnston, E-mail message to author, July 19, 2017.

collective action attains the group's stated goal. He concludes that a combination of these two levels of assessment measures success based on manifest and latent functions of a collective action organization.⁷⁰

Merton coined the concept of manifest and latent functions. The former are those functions which are intended, and people recognize, while the latter are unrecognized and unintended even though they can still have positive consequences.⁷¹

Collective action organizations have both manifest and latent functions. For an anti-corruption collective action, manifest functions could be, for example, improving transparency in the procurement of public infrastructure projects to reduce corruption. The latent functions can be to strengthen multi-sectoral collaboration. This latent function can also contribute to achieving the manifest functions. In the absence of valid measurement of success, it is possible that these collective action organizations can be viewed to have failed by the public because in their assessment, they did not meet their publicly stated goals. However, it is also possible that beside this, they may have actually still succeeded in achieving their latent functions.

Agrawal and Goyal suggest a more practical way of measuring the success of a collective action. Their propositions are based on their study of group size

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Sociology Guide, *Robert Merton's Latent and Manifest Functions*, accessed Sept. 24, 2017, <http://www.sociologyguide.com/socio-short-notes/latent-and-manifest-functions.php>.

and collective action. They state that developing performance indicators tracked against set benchmarks is one way of measuring success. Their study tracked three variables as performance indicators. These were the number of meetings per year that the collective action organization had, the total budget from contributions of the members and per capita contributions.⁷²

While this method is convenient and simple to employ, it mostly focuses on measuring process indicators, which can be misleading in some contexts. The mere achievement of these indicators against the benchmarks set does not imply success. While the achievement of these targets may easily help to measure success in the short term, where the goals of the collective action are long term, it might be problematic to extrapolate from these to measure impact.

The UN Global Compact program proposes the use of indicators to measure progress and to determine whether a policy or program is thriving as a methodology.⁷³ It also suggests measuring and monitoring impact by setting indicators.⁷⁴ It, however, does not elaborate much on ways for doing this.

⁷² Arun Agrawal & Sanjeev Goyal, *Group size and collective action: Third-party monitoring in common-pool resources*, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2001, 80, accessed Sept. 24, 2017, <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~arunagra/papers/Group%20Size%20and%20Collective%20Action.pdf>.

⁷³ UN Global Compact, *The case for cooperation* 19.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 20.

Measuring success or impact of anti-corruption efforts in general is still the Achilles heel of most anti-corruption efforts. Johnson and Mason consider that measurement of changes in corruption levels and evaluating the impact of anti-corruption interventions is a perennial challenge.⁷⁵ The UN Global Compact also states that the requirement to compare corruption levels before and after any intervention makes measuring the results and impact of anti-corruption activities difficult.⁷⁶

This study will not attempt to resolve this issue as it lies outside its scope. Rather, the intention is to appreciate how the targeted collective action organizations address this issue, what justifications they use and how these relate to general scholarly debates on the subject.

This difficulty of measuring success exists for several reasons. The complex nature of corruption makes it difficult to measure it directly. Consequently, reliance is placed on proxy indicators. Anti-corruption collective action organizations therefore face the challenge of lacking credible measurement tools to judge or showcase success and impact of their efforts. Lack of reliable ways to measure the impact of anti-corruption work results in

⁷⁵ Jesper Johnsen and Mason Phil, *The proxy challenge: Why bespoke proxy indicators can help solve the anti-corruption measurement problem*, U4, 2013, accessed Sept. 23, 2017, <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4873-the-proxy-challenge.pdf>.

⁷⁶ UN Global Compact, *A Practical Guide for collective action against corruption*, 2015, 86, accessed Sept. 11, 2017, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/Anti-Corruption/CollectiveActionExperiencesGlobal.pdf.

reliance on perception which has its own challenges. Results of collective action efforts can often be processes related or outcome related.⁷⁷

Some scholarly discussions on the issue of measuring the success or failure of a collective action have only dwelt on highlighting the key factors that are crucial to the success and guaranteeing the sustainability of a collective action. Ostrom, for example, has suggested eight factors that she considers critical to the success and sustainability of collective action organizations. Some of the factors she cites include that stakeholders who are affected by the rules governing the common goods can participate in modifying the rules. She also states that outside authorities must respect the rights of stakeholders to make rules. Furthermore, a system aimed at monitoring the conduct of stakeholders must be in place. Finally, progressive sanctions are meted out against stakeholders who violate the rules governing the use of common goods.⁷⁸

These factors have been challenged for their lack of clarity on several issues. These include the size and condition of some of the common goods, but also excluding the social success factors which are central to the functioning and success of collective action organizations.⁷⁹ They have also been

⁷⁷ UN Global Compact, *A Practical Guide for collective action against corruption*, 86.

⁷⁸ Jay Walljasper, *Elinor Ostrom's 8 principles for managing a commons*, On the Commons, 2011, accessed Jul 4, 2017, <http://www.onthecommons.org/magazine/elinor-ostroms-8-principles-managing-commons#sthash.pXFAGzG.Tv6Qr6gU.dpbs>.

⁷⁹ Ministry for the Environment, *Collective action success in New Zealand*, Wellington, New Zealand, 2012, Publication No. ME 1104, accessed Sept 11, 2017, https://www.mfe.govt.nz/sites/default/files/collective-action-success-in-nz_0.pdf.

criticized for being mostly focussed on dealing with structural and operational issues of the collective action organizations.⁸⁰

Factors such as substantial transactional costs associated with running some collective action organizations, e.g., travel costs, public consultation, meetings, facilitation, and other costs which may over time prove unsustainable leading to failure of collective action organizations, have been cited as key constraints to success and sustainability of collective action organizations.⁸¹ Brigham also cites coordination problems sometimes occasioned by conflicting interest amongst members, competing objectives, agendas, and values which fail to facilitate generation of shared experiences.⁸² Wheatland mentions factors such as inadequate incentives to attract and incentivize stakeholders to join a coalition and determine the outcomes of the collective action, lack of legitimacy of the coalition, especially amongst the citizenry, and uncertain outcomes considering that results of collective efforts take some time to accrue to the beneficiaries.⁸³

Anti-corruption collective action efforts may also fail to make an impact purely on the basis that despite their good intentions and efforts, the interventions they champion are designed based on a mischaracterization of the corruption problem they seek to address. In their ground-breaking paper

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ministry for the Environment, *Collective action success in New Zealand*, 3.

⁸² Brayden G. King, *A social movement perspective of the stakeholder collective action and influence*, *Business and Society*, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2007, 20, accessed Sept 11, 2017, <https://orgtheory.files.wordpress.com/2007/02/king-bands-final-revision.pdf>.

⁸³ Wheatland and Chêne, *Barriers to collective action*, 6.

which challenged the use of traditional ways to characterize the corruption problem, Persson et al. argued that presently systemic corruption, particularly in third world countries, is characterized as primarily a principal-agent problem. This characterization has served as a premise for most of the interventions, including collective action efforts.⁸⁴

Persson et al. undertook a study in Uganda and Kenya that illustrated how systemic corruption functions as a collective action. The study focused on why anti-corruption reforms fail. They concluded that the key reason for failure is that they mischaracterize the corruption problem as purely a principal-agent problem when in fact most systemic corruption is a collective action problem.⁸⁵ It is, therefore, possible that collective action efforts that fall into the trap of mischaracterization of the problem they are dealing with, can fail.

To sum up, from the literature reviewed, it becomes apparent that most scholars have proposed methods that track outputs and suggest using these as a yardstick for determining whether a collective action is succeeding or not. There are no propositions on practical methodologies that can holistically and accurately measure the impact of anti-corruption collective action.

⁸⁴ Anna Persson, Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell, *The failure of anti-corruption policies: A theoretical mischaracterization of the problem*, The Quality of Government Institute, Working Paper 2010:19, University of Gothenburg, 3, accessed Sept 11, 2017, https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/39039/1/gupea_2077_39039_1.pdf.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

What is also striking from the literature reviewed, is that currently, the scholarly discussion and debates have not addressed the issue of the role which incentives play in influencing the success or failure of collective action, even at the present level at which it is measured or determined. They have also not addressed the extent to which incentives can explain the failure of collective action efforts.

2.8. Conclusion

Various scholarly debates and theoretical propositions on issues relating to the scope of this study have been presented in the preceding sections. It is apparent that much of the scholarly debate on collective action has dwelt on explaining how it occurs. It is also clear that some areas such as how to assess the success or failure, and particularly the impact of anti-corruption collective action organizations, are still evolving and, therefore, the debate on these remains inconclusive.

Presently, scholarly discussions or theoretical propositions in existing literature have not addressed areas such as the influence of incentives on collective action. The review has also exposed the dearth of empirical studies, especially within the region and beyond, that have exclusively focussed on anti-corruption collective action. Much of what has been discussed and debated in theory on collective action remains empirically untested, particularly in the area of anti-corruption, to ascertain its relevance and applicability to this field.

The next chapter will present and discuss the methodology that has been used in the current study to collect, collate, interpret, and analyze the data.

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodology used in this study to explore the research question and objectives. It elaborates the philosophical paradigm, the data collection and analysis methods, the research strategy, and the sampling methods and tools used in the study. It concludes with brief highlights on some critical ethical considerations underpinning the study.

3.2. Philosophical paradigm underpinning this study

In deciding the research paradigm to govern any study, Dash suggests four critical considerations. They include the nature of the social phenomena under investigation, whether the social phenomenon is objective or created by the human mind, the basis of knowledge corresponding to the social reality, how knowledge can be acquired and disseminated, and the relationship of an individual with their environment.⁸⁶ This study sought to explore the influence which incentives have on stakeholders' participation in anti-corruption collective action. In addition, it sought to establish the extent to which incentive structures account for the success or failure and sustainability of anti-corruption collective action. Based on the core issues

⁸⁶ Nirod K. Dash, *Module: Selection of the research paradigm and methodology, Online research methods resource for teachers and trainers*, 2005, accessed July 20, 2017, https://www.celt.mmu.ac.uk/researchmethods/Modules/Selection_of_methodology/.

that the study sought to explore, the positivist and interpretivist paradigms were considered as relevant philosophical paradigms to the phenomena under study.

3.2.1. Positivist paradigm

Positivists study and interpret human behavior objectively. They apply scientific research techniques to gain understanding and interpret social phenomena.⁸⁷ Positivist studies are associated with quantitative methods of research and use structured questionnaires to collect and analyze data to establish cause-effect relationships between variables.⁸⁸

3.2.2. Interpretivist paradigm

Interpretivists, on the other hand, reject the notion of treating society as a science. They argue that the social world differs from the natural world in that it is complicated and is reproduced on almost a daily basis by people through social interaction and values they attach to social phenomenon. In their view, such occurrences do not render society amenable to scientific approaches to studying it.⁸⁹ Interpretivists use qualitative methods such as unstructured interviews, participant observation and other related field

⁸⁷ David E. Gray, *Doing research in the real world*, Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2013, 21.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Sociology Factsheet No. 52, *Positivism vs. Interpretivism*, accessed July 9, 2017, <http://www.curriculum-press.co.uk/products/sociology-factsheet--52--positivism--v--interpretivism.html>.

research techniques involving active collaboration with the participants to measure social phenomena.⁹⁰


The social phenomenon which is the core focus of this study is incentives and incentive structures. Specifically, the study sought to explore how the stakeholders are influenced by incentive structures to decide whether they would participate in anti-corruption collective action organization. It also sought to establish the extent to which the incentive structures explain success or failure and sustainability of anti-corruption collective action organizations. Despite this being human behavior, the research question sought to establish if there is any causal relationship between variables.

Against this backdrop, therefore, a mixed research approach combining both the positivist and interpretivist paradigms was adopted, albeit the positivist research paradigm being the predominant approach, mainly at the data collection stage. Interpretivist methodologies, such as observation and focused group discussion, could not be suitable for data collection in this study considering the amount of time, cost and organization that would be required to mobilize the participants who do not engage in these collection action organizations on a full-time basis.


⁹⁰ Revise Sociology, *Positivism and interpretivism in social research*, May 18, 2015, accessed July 9, 2017, <https://revisesociology.com/2015/05/18/positivism-interpretivism-sociology/>.

3.3. Research approach

In deciding on a suitable research approach to use, the study considered the deductive and inductive research methods.⁹¹ The deductive approach is suitable for testing the validity of a theory or hypotheses. It precedes with theory and hypothesis development, and thereafter designs a research strategy to test the theory or hypothesis by empirical observation. The theory and hypothesis developed drives the process of data collection. The diagram below illustrates a deductive approach:⁹²



An inductive approach, on the other hand, starts with specific observations based on which data is collected. From this, broader generalizations and theories emerge.⁹³ The diagram below illustrates an inductive approach:⁹⁴



⁹¹ Research Methodology, *Research approach*, accessed July 12, 2017, <http://research-methodology.net/research-methodology/research-approach/>.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

This study sought to explore the extent to which incentive structures influence participation of stakeholders in anti-corruption collective action. Further it sought to establish if incentives can explain failure or success of the anti-corruption collective action. The suitable approach for this study was, therefore, the deductive approach. The study sought to ascertain a causal relationship between identified variables. A research question and hypotheses were developed for testing and to establish the relationship between the variables in the hypotheses.

3.4. Research design and strategy

The study considered the suitability of qualitative and quantitative approaches as research strategies.

3.4.1. Quantitative methods

According to Creswell, this approach is suitable for testing scientific theories. The primary goal of quantitative research is to determine the relationship between independent and dependent variables within a population. These are objectively assessed using research instruments. They rely on analysis of data collected through questionnaires and surveys.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ John W. Creswell, *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches*, London: SAGE Publications, 2003, 8.

Quantitative research mostly uses structured research instruments to collect data and has a defined research question.⁹⁶

3.4.2. Qualitative research

Qualitative research, on the other hand, involves exploration and gaining an understanding of the meaning which individuals or groups attached to social or human phenomena. The research process under this research strategy involves emerging questions and procedures, and it gathers data in the participant's setting. The collected data is analyzed using inductive methods, and the researcher interprets the meaning of the data from this analysis.⁹⁷ It adopts a more general and interpretive criterion for disconfirmation of hypotheses.⁹⁸

This study used the quantitative methods, especially at the data collection stage. This was mainly through the use of structured questionnaires. The data analysis stage relied on qualitative approaches albeit to a limited extent. Application of this approach of combining methodologies, commonly referred to as the mixed methods, is occasioned by, among other factors, the nature of the issue under study as well as the type of data to be

⁹⁶ USC Libraries Research Guides, *Organizing your social sciences research paper: Quantitative methods*, University of South California Libraries, accessed July 19, 2017, <http://libguides.usc.edu/writingguide/quantitative>.

⁹⁷ Creswell, *Research Design*, 8.

⁹⁸ Michael Johnston, E-mail message to author, July 19, 2017.

collected. A mixed approach results in a more comprehensive understanding of the research subject matter, among other benefits.⁹⁹

3.5. Sampling methods used in the study

The study utilised non-probability sampling methods. Non-probability sampling involves selection based on the subjective judgment of the researcher.¹⁰⁰ This kind of sampling is suitable in research of social issues. Specifically, this study used purposive sampling. This kind of non-probability sampling is often applied when the researcher has a predefined group in mind that they are seeking.¹⁰¹

This study targeted a specific group of people who have been part of the collective action organizations. The respondents were organizers and stakeholders who were members of the targeted organizations. They also included those who were closely associated with the organizations, mainly at the technical and financial levels, and considered as key informants. All these groups were selected as they could provide information that could help address the objectives of the study and the research question. Purposive sampling was also considered suitable for this study because the population from which the sample was to be drawn was relatively small.

⁹⁹ Better Thesis, *Combining qualitative and quantitative methods*, University of Southern Denmark, accessed Feb 22, 2017, <http://betterthesis.dk/research-methods/lesson-1-different-approaches-to-research/combining-qualitative-and-quantitative-methods>.

¹⁰⁰ Statistics How To, *Non-probability sampling: Definition, types*, accessed July 19, 2017, <http://www.statisticshowto.com/non-probability-sampling/>.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

Sampling for this study involved five stages. The first step involved identification of the anti-corruption collective action organizations to be the subject of this study. After this was done, organizers of these collective action organizations, followed by members of these organizations, were identified. The process then identified crucial informants for each collective action organization. Finally, secondary data sources for the study were also identified.

An assessment was first done to establish the total number of anti-corruption collective action organizations that have been formed since 1995. Seven potential organizations were identified as follows: (a) the National Integrity Committee (NIC), (b) the Business Action against Corruption (BAAC), (c) the Interagency Committee for Combating Wildlife Crimes (IACCWC), (d) the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (COSTI), (e) the National Integrity Platform (NIP), (f) the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), and (g) the Civil Society Action Against Corruption (CSAAC).

The study considered how long these organizations had existed and how active they were over that period. This was a key consideration because the issues which the study explored, particularly success or failure and sustainability of anti-corruption collective action, required a selection of organizations that had been consistently active for a considerable period of time, i.e., at least three years in which they had been active.

Out of the seven organizations, three organizations, i.e., CSAAC, NIP, and EITI, failed to meet the threshold for inclusion into the study. The study found that CSAAC was just proposed and started some preliminary work but never took off. It had, therefore, not been active enough for a reasonable period of time. The NIP has several stakeholders as members, but it has not been very active and is still in the process of becoming a civil society platform on integrity issues. It was therefore considered not appropriate to include it. The study found that though the EITI was still in existence, it was not consistently active.

The exclusion of these organizations, which have a sizeable civil society membership, did not, however, diminish civil society representation in the overall sample of this study since there was also an active civil society participation in all the other four organizations that qualified for inclusion in this study.

Out of the four remaining organizations, two, i.e., the National Integrity Committee (NIC) and the Business Action Against Corruption (BAAC), could be considered as falling into the category of the first generation of collective action efforts explained in Chapter 1. The Interagency Committee for Combating Wildlife Crimes (IACCWC) and the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (COSTI) belong to second generation anti-corruption efforts.

3.6. Data collection

This study relied on primary sources of data. Primary sources of data are original materials which include first-hand accounts or direct evidence relating to the topic of study.¹⁰² In this study, the primary sources included the organizers of these collective actions, the stakeholders or members of these organizations, who mostly were sector representatives and attended meetings and participated in activities of these organizations, and finally, observers who were key Informants. Observers were mainly those who either provided financial or technical support or actively followed the activities but were not members of these organizations nor had voting rights or took part in active decision making.

The study also utilized secondary sources of data. These refer to the sources which interpret or analyze primary sources and in the context of this study included documents that were reviewed by the author, such as reports, online sources and various publications used during the discussion and interpretation of the data collected from primary sources.

Some of the key informants used in this study, however, could also be classified as secondary sources because they did not have a direct relationship with the organizations nor participated in their activities. They

¹⁰² University of Rochester, *Primary and secondary sources*, accessed July 25, 2017, <https://www.library.rochester.edu/Primary-secondary%20sources>.

were interviewed based on their knowledge and academic experience which is relevant to the issues under study.

The study targeted all the organizers and members for each of the above named organizations. The study opted to target all of them because it was a manageable population and a significant number of them were resident in the same region as the researcher. Targeting more respondents was considered necessary since each member of these organizations represented a different sector or organization. It was also deemed as necessary to increase the representativeness of the responses and enhance the credibility of the results.

3.7. Data collection tools

The primary data collection tool used in this study was a structured questionnaire. It was designed in such a way that it could either be self-administered or used as a structured interview guide, depending on the respondent preference. The questionnaire was considered appropriate in this study as it enabled the responses to be standardized and thus ease the process of their collating and analyzing. It also facilitated the ease of comparison of the responses during the analysis.

3.8. Structure and content of the questionnaire

The study used three versions of the questionnaire, one version for each of the three respondent groups, i.e., the organizers of the anti-corruption collective action organizations, the participants or members of the organizations, and key informants.

The questionnaire for the organizers covered issues ranging from the background of the collective action organization, management structure of the organization, incentive structures of the organization, and assessment of how they viewed issues pertaining to performance of the collective action organization. It was comprised of twenty questions which were predominantly open-ended.

The questionnaire for the members addressed issues ranging from how they joined the organization, what influenced them to join, incentives that were offered, the extent to which they influenced their decision to join, their participation level, and their assessment of the performance of the organization. It had twelve questions divided almost equally between closed and open-ended questions.

The key informant questionnaire addressed issues ranging from why stakeholders join anti-corruption collective action organizations, their views on incentive structures, as well as the influence of these structures on success or failure and sustainability of anti-corruption collective action organizations. It had eight questions of which six were open-ended questions and two close-ended questions.

The use of open-ended questions was appropriate because these collective action organizations have diverse membership ranging from the media, the public and private sectors to civil society. Open-ended questions were, therefore, considered appropriate to facilitate expression and documentation of diverse views from these sectors.

The questionnaires for this study used the word "*benefit*" instead of "incentives". This was to avoid potential misunderstanding of the term "*incentives*" in the Malawian context. The results of the pre-testing revealed that the substitution of the term "*benefit*" would be better understood in relation to the activities of the collective action organization and that it would convey the same meaning as "*incentives*."

3.9. Expert review of the questionnaire

Before data collection, the questionnaire was first reviewed by several experts. This process was done as a substitute for pretesting. Pretesting was considered not ideal in this study for two reasons. Firstly, the size of the overall sample was small, i.e., thirty-three (33) persons, and constituted stakeholders from diverse institutions and sectors. Pretesting on potential respondents of the study would have ended up spoiling the sample since the respondents who participated in the pretesting would not again be eligible to be selected for the main interview. Omitting them would, in turn, result in views from these institutions or sectors not represented in the final analysis.

Secondly, apart from these four organizations, there were no other collective action organizations with similar characteristics and the same area of focus from which the study could draw the pretesting sample.

Three experts were purposely selected to review the questionnaire. One was an anti-corruption practitioner with over fifteen years' experience, another was a senior member of academia with experience in anti-corruption issues, and the last one had vast experience in working on democratic governance issues. The experts were asked to review the questionnaires and provide feedback on their impression, isolate the areas which they felt were not very clear, and propose what could be included or left out of the questionnaires.

All three respondents provided feedback. The feedback ranged from proposed refinements to some of the questions to provide more clarity and an addition of some questions to rearrangement of the order in which some questions were listed in the questionnaire to conform to the objectives of the study. Most of the proposed changes were incorporated in the questionnaire.

3.10. Mode of administration of the questionnaire

Personal interviews were the most significant and valuable source of information for this study. The researcher conducted the interviews. The interviews took place within the premises of the respondents. Some of the respondents, however, opted to respond on their own because their busy work schedules within the data collection period could not accommodate a

face to face interview. Respondents who lived and worked outside the location where the researcher is based mostly opted to complete the questionnaire and send it back via email.

Participants were given a choice between a face to face interview or completing the questionnaire on their own. In total, twenty (20) face to face interviews were conducted and thirteen (13) people opted for self-administered questionnaires, for a total of thirty-three (33) participants. All the questionnaires were in English. The language of communication for the face to face interviews was also English. Before commencing the interviews, especially for the stakeholders, permission was sought from the organizers to target their organization for this study.

The researcher arranged meetings with the principal persons who oversaw the operations of the anti-corruption collective action organizations. The organizers were also the first group to be interviewed. This arrangement enabled them to have a feel of what the study was all about. However, the agreement by organizers to interview stakeholders was contingent on the stakeholders themselves agreeing to an interview.

Structured questionnaires have risks which range from low response rate, delayed responses which might delay the research project, and misunderstanding of questions which might lead to wrong answers or

dishonesty.¹⁰³ However, the calibre, level of perception and appreciation of the issues which were the subject of the study was high considering that they have been involved with the organizations under study for a long time. This minimized these risks associated with structured questionnaires as could be deciphered from the pattern of the responses during collating and analysis of the responses.

The use of face to face interviews, except where the respondent elected to complete the questionnaire on their own and also purposive selection of the respondents as required by the nature and issue under study, also enhanced the quality and accuracy of the responses. In cases involving face to face interviews, the questionnaires were sent in advance to the respondents to provide them with an opportunity to appreciate the issues and reflect on them before the actual interview.

This approach was possible because, as much as each of the collective action organization does address sensitive issues, the research focused on a less sensitive issue of incentives. As a result of this, respondents readily agreed to a face to face interview.

¹⁰³ Stefan Debois, *Advantages and disadvantages of questionnaires*, Survey Anyplace, March 16, 2016, accessed Sept. 18, 2017, <https://surveyanyplace.com/questionnaire-pros-and-cons/>.

3.11. Document review

The study also utilized document review as a secondary data source to supplement the data collected from the personal interviews. Document review is the collection of data by reviewing existing documents which may be internal organizational documents or external documents. The documents may be hard copy or electronic, and may include reports, minutes of meetings, newsletters, etc.¹⁰⁴

In this study, documents reviewed ranged from background information on the collective action organizations, terms of reference and action plans, information on the websites of those organizations which have an online presence, minutes of meetings, annual reports, and other related documents. Most of the data obtained in this way included additional background information on each of the collective action organizations, activities that they are involved in, successes and challenges, and other information relevant to the issues in this study.

3.12. Data analysis and interpretation

The study utilized both quantitative and qualitative methods to analyze the data. The nature of the data collected necessitated the mixture of these two methods. Analysis of data from closed-ended questions was done using

¹⁰⁴ *Data collection methods for evaluation: Document review*, ETA Evaluation Briefs, No. 18, January 2009, accessed Jan. 18, 2017, <https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/evaluation/pdf/brief18.pdf>.

quantitative methods while analysis of data generated from open-ended questions relied mostly, but not entirely, on qualitative methods.

The analysis of the data was primarily done manually. There was very little use of software applications. The reason for this was the lack of appropriate specialized research software to aid the analysis process. Although the manual process can be slow and fraught with possibilities of errors, the sample size was small enough to hedge against these inherent risks.

A combination of Microsoft Word and Excel software applications were used to code and aggregate the responses. This enabled the presentation of an overall response picture. Consequently, it allowed the researcher to decipher any apparently peculiar trends reflected in the data. Following this stage, further aggregation and categorization of the data were made based on several issues. These illustrated observable patterns relating to specific questions by different stakeholders.

Qualitative analysis of the data enabled isolation of common themes in the responses. The analysis identified different categories for the various themes. Close attention was also paid to patterns of responses by various respondents and based on the categorizations, they were grouped and then labeled and interpreted accordingly.

3.13. Ethical considerations

In this study, the researcher told the respondents his name, the name of the academic institution and the academic course in which he was enrolled. The researcher obtained authorization before data collection. The researcher asked the respondents if they were willing to participate in the study by being interviewed.

The majority of the cases involved sending the questionnaire via email after talking to the potential interviewee mostly on the phone. Following this, an appointment would be set up to do the formal interview. The respondents were known to the researcher. Their names did not appear on the questionnaire. Also, this thesis does not include their names.

3.14. Challenges encountered

The study encountered several challenges. The key one include difficulties in getting information. This was mainly on one of the anti-corruption collective action organizations, the BAAC. Though it only became inactive a few years ago, it was a challenge to locate some of its members, organizers and key informants. This situation was compounded by the limited data collection period. Snowball sampling was used to locate most of the respondents interviewed. This resulted in further delay in concluding the data collection process.

The lack of access to software for data analysis also presented a challenge that delayed the data analysis process. The delay occurred despite the

sample being small. The range of issues that had to be analyzed and their complexity slowed down the process of data analysis. The delays were also partly to minimize any errors which manual methods can cause.

3.15. A brief profile of the organizations

The study sampled four collective action organizations in Malawi. The paragraphs below describe and profile them, but the detailed narratives on each are in Appendix 1.

1. The National Integrity Committee (NIC).¹⁰⁵ The committee was established in 2009 following the launch of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy. Its purpose was to harness sectoral efforts to fight corruption by establishing a National Integrity System. The sectors which were members of this committee were the public sector, the private sector, the legislature, the judiciary, civil society, the media, faith-based organizations, and traditional leaders. It operated until 2014 before becoming dormant.

2. The Business Action Against Corruption (BAAC).¹⁰⁶ This coalition was launched in 2005. It served as a platform to coordinate private sector efforts in anti-corruption and promotion of corporate governance issues. It drew membership mainly from private sector

¹⁰⁵ Anti-corruption Bureau, Malawi, National Anti-corruption strategy, accessed March 30, 2017, http://www.acbmw.org/?page_id=288.

¹⁰⁶ UN Global Compact, *Business fighting corruption*, 50.

organizations and some public-sector organizations, with civil society as the champion of the initiative. It operated until 2012 before becoming dormant.

3. The Interagency Committee for Combating Wildlife Crimes

(IACCWC).¹⁰⁷ This committee was established in 2014 to promote wildlife conservation which was under threat mainly from wildlife crimes which were partly influenced by corruption. It is a multiagency and multi-stakeholder initiative comprising government agencies, the media and civil society organizations. It is still in operation and very active.

4. The Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (COSTI).¹⁰⁸

The initiative started in 2008. Its goal is to promote transparency and accountability in the construction sector to reduce corruption and to promote value for money in projects. A multi-stakeholder group (MSG) oversees its operations. The MSG is comprised of members drawn from the government, the parastatal oversight body, civil society, private sector representatives, and the media oversight body. It is in operation and very active.

¹⁰⁷ Environment Investigation Agency, *Malawi Investing in Enforcement*, accessed March 30, 2017, https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/eia_iwtp-report-malawi.pdf.

¹⁰⁸ Construction Sector Transparency Initiative, *Overview of transparency in the construction sector*, 27 April 2014, accessed Sept 11, 2017, <http://www.constructiontransparency.org/malawi>.

3.16. Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the methodology used in the study. Though the nature of the issue that this study set out to explore is social, a mixed method approach was used because the study involves establishing relationships between several variables. The chapter has concluded by highlighting ethical considerations and some challenges encountered during the research. The next chapter will present the research findings for this study.

4. RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

4.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of the study. It will also review the findings in the light of the hypotheses that were developed for testing in this study. In seeking to address the research question and the objectives of this study, four collective action organizations were selected purposively as the focus of the study.

In these organizations, the study sought to identify the different types of incentive structures that existed. It further sought to establish if the incentives influenced the participation of various stakeholders in the collective action organizations. It also sought to determine whether these organizations failed or succeeded, and what contribution the incentive structures made in this process as well as in sustaining the collective action efforts.

4.2. An overview of key theories underpinning this study

Chapter 2 presented an extensive discussion of literature relating to the main issues in this study. Among the key theories discussed were Arthur Bentley's group theory and Mancur Olson's logic of collective action. Group theorists argue that collective action automatically occurs where there is

mutual interests and individuals perceive benefits from cooperation.¹⁰⁹ Olson's logic of collective action, on the other hand, argue that cooperation for a common cause does not always emerge even where shared interest or perceived benefits from cooperation exist. This occurs especially where individuals feel they can still gain from benefits of cooperation without acting collectively with others. He argues that in such cases, individuals tend to free ride on other people's efforts. He consequently asserts that unless some form of coercion is applied or other specific interventions are made to make individuals act in their common interest, collective action cannot occur.¹¹⁰ He argues that selective incentives are a necessary element required to motivate individuals to act collectively.¹¹¹

4.3. Results of the hypotheses

The study set out to investigate whether incentive structures significantly influence stakeholders' participation in collective action. It further sought to ascertain if failure of collective action can be attributed to flawed incentive structures. Based on these questions, several hypotheses were developed for testing against the evidence from the data collected by this study. These were presented in Chapter 1. The hypotheses and their corresponding results are presented below.

¹⁰⁹ Mary M. Matthews, *International lending agencies and regional environmental cooperation in the Black and Caspian Sea*, Department of Political Science, University of Georgia, 2000, 3, accessed Sept 11, 2017, <http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/676/matthewsm042400.pdf?sequence=1>.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, 51.

4.3.1. Null hypothesis

H⁰: Incentive structures have no apparent effect on the stakeholder's decision to participate in collective action.

This hypothesis predicted that no relationship exists between the two key variables in the research question, i.e., incentive structures and decision to participate. The hypothesis was tested based on an analysis of responses to the following questions: *What incentives (“benefits”) were offered in exchange for participation, what incentives (“benefits”) the stakeholders anticipated in exchange for their participation, whether the incentives (“benefits”) offered by the collective action organizations influenced their participation and how, and whether incentives (“benefits”) influenced their participation levels.* Conclusions were drawn based on a preponderance of the evidence.

The evidence from stakeholders, organizers and key informants in this study confirmed that incentives offered by these organizations substantially influenced stakeholder's decision to participate in their respective collective action organizations. The evidence further showed that incentives substantially influenced the level of participation throughout the period in which the collective action existed. The evidence, therefore, rejects this hypothesis.

4.3.2. Alternative hypotheses

H¹: Stakeholder's decision to participate in collective action is influenced by the existence of credible incentive structures in the collective action organization.

This hypothesis predicted the existence of a relationship between the variables, i.e., stakeholders' decision to participate and the existence of credible incentive structures. To test this hypothesis, responses to the following questions were analyzed. Conclusions were drawn again based on the preponderance of the evidence: *What incentives ("benefits") the collective action organizations offered in exchange for participation, what incentives ("benefits") the stakeholders anticipated in exchange for their participation, whether the incentives ("benefits") offered by the collective action organizations influenced their participation, and whether the incentives ("benefits") were realized.*

The evidence presented in the previous hypothesis illustrate that incentives substantially influenced stakeholder's decision to participate. The evidence based on the analysis of responses to the questions also concluded that the incentive structures were mostly credible. It further established that stakeholders realized the incentives they anticipated from the collective action organizations. On this basis, the evidence supports this hypothesis.

H²: Successful collective action efforts rely extensively upon a diverse system of incentives.

This hypothesis predicted that success of collective action depends on incentive structures that comprise a diverse range of incentives. The hypothesis was tested based on an analysis of responses to the following set of questions: *What incentives (“benefits”) the collective action organizations offered in exchange for participation, what incentives (“benefits”) the stakeholders anticipated in exchange for their participation, whether the incentives (“benefits”) offered by the collective action organizations influenced their participation, whether the organizers and stakeholders considered the collective action to have been a success, how they reached that conclusion, and whether they consider incentives (“benefits”) to have contributed to that success and how.* Conclusions were drawn based on a preponderance of the evidence.

The evidence showed that the collective action organizations were considered successful by the stakeholders. It also showed that the collective action organizations had incentive structures that constituted a diverse range and mix of incentive types, even though purposive incentives were dominant and were mostly cited by the stakeholders to have been more influential, not just in their decision to participate.

The evidence from the study also suggested that the stakeholders did not attribute success exclusively to the incentive structures but also listed other factors. While the evidence has shown a substantial influence of incentives on success, it has also shown that one type of incentives had more influence in determining success. On this basis, therefore, the evidence from this study does not fully support the hypothesis.

H³: Flawed incentive structures significantly account for the failure of collective action

This hypothesis predicted that a relationship between flawed incentive structures and failure of collective action exists. The hypothesis was tested based on an analysis of responses to the following set of questions: *What incentives (“benefits”) the collective organizations offered in exchange for participation, what incentives (“benefits”) the stakeholders anticipated in exchange for their participation, and whether the incentives (“benefits”) offered by the collective action organizations influenced their participation.* Conclusions were drawn based on a preponderance of the evidence.

Based on an analysis of the responses, the study concluded that incentive structures offered by the organizations were mostly credible. The evidence also showed that most stakeholders considered their collective action effort to have been a success. It further established that the stakeholders who

indicated that their organizations had failed imputed the failure to other factors and not incentive structures.

Despite all the organizations being considered to have succeeded, the evidence from the few respondents who considered their organizations to have failed rejects this hypothesis because, as the results show, they did not blame failure on incentives. Since the study established that the incentive structures were credible, there was, therefore, no evidence to provide a basis for ascertaining this hypothesis.

H⁴ Failure of collective action can still occur even where there is the existence of a credible incentive structure.

This hypothesis predicted that credible incentive structures alone could not prevent the failure of the collective action. To test this hypothesis, responses to the following set of questions were consolidated and analyzed: *What incentives (“benefits”) the collective action organizations offered in exchange for participation, what incentives (“benefits”) the stakeholders anticipated in exchange for their participation, whether the incentives (“benefits”) offered by the collective action organizations influenced their participation, whether the organizers and stakeholders considered the collective action to have been a success or failure, how they reached that conclusion, and whether they consider incentives (“benefits”) to have contributed to that success or failure and how.* Conclusions were drawn based on a preponderance of evidence.

The conclusion from the analysis of the incentive structures indicated that they were credible. The study found that stakeholders and organizers measured the success or failure mostly on an output basis. As such, they concluded that none of the collective action organizations failed.

The evidence further showed that stakeholders who indicated that their collective action organizations had failed attributed failure to other factors and not incentives. The evidence shows that whilst failure is not attributed to incentives, it can still occur due to other factors, despite credible incentive structures. The hypothesis is, therefore, partially supported because the view supporting it came from a minority of the responses. The majority did not consider failure to have occurred.

H⁵: Purposive incentives, while they make up the core of most collective action organizations, are not likely to be sufficient by themselves.

This hypothesis predicted that purposive incentives could not exclusively determine the success and sustainability of the collective action. To test this hypothesis, data was consolidated and analyzed based on responses to the following set of questions: *what incentives structures the collective action organizations had as responded to by organizers, what incentives ("benefits") stakeholders expected to get through participation, whether the organizers and stakeholders considered the collective action to have been a success,*

whether they consider incentives (“benefits”) to have contributed to that success, and other factors they considered to have contributed to the success or failure. Conclusions were drawn based on a preponderance of evidence.

The evidence gathered from analysis of responses to these questions indicate that the collective action organizations had incentive structures which had a mix of incentives ranging from the material and purposive to solidarity incentives, with a predominance of purposive incentives. It, however, found that when it came to the achievement of success and sustainability of the collective action, despite stakeholders attributing it mostly to incentives, there was also attribution to other factors beyond incentives.

The evidence, therefore, confirm this hypothesis only to an extent, but looking at the proportion of responses that attributed the influence to other factors, it does also suggest that incentives may not be sufficient to sustain collective action.

4.4. Background Information

4.4.1. Description of respondents interviewed for the study

Three groups of respondents drawn from four collective action organizations participated in the interviews conducted in this study as follows:

- a. Individuals who represent or represented (in case of the NIC and BAAC) their respective organizations, sectors or interest groups in these collective action organizations.
- b. Organizers or host institutions of the collective action organizations. These manage or oversee the operations of these organizations.
- c. Key informants are individuals who are associated (or were associated) with the collective action organizations and attend meetings of the collective action organizations mostly in an observer capacity. They included donor representatives who financed or provided technical support to some of the activities of these organizations or their representatives.

A combined total of thirty-three (33) respondents from these categories participated in the interviews. The highest proportion of respondents were from the COSTI, at 36% of the total sample, and the lowest proportion was from the BAAC, at 12% of the total sample. The detailed breakdown is as follows:

Table 1: Breakdown of respondents per organization

Collective action organization	Total membership	Members interviewed¹¹²	Organizers interviewed	Key Informants interviewed	Proportion of the total sample
NIC	9 sectors	7	1	1	27%
BAAC	Information not available	2	1	1	12%
IACCWC	13 institutions	6	1	1	24%
COSTI	14 institutions	9	2	1	36%
TOTAL	33 ¹¹³	24	5	4	100%

Out of the twenty-four (24) members of the collective action organizations interviewed, 71% (17 out of 24) had been representing their organizations, groups or sectors in their respective collective action organization since their inception. Three (3) out of the five (5) organizers interviewed for this study had been running or overseeing the operations of their respective collective action organizations since inception. The other two (2) joined a few years after inception. At the time of the interviews, they had been working with their organizations for more than four years. Three (3) out of the four (4)

¹¹²These were representatives of the institutions/sectors that were members of the collective action organization.

¹¹³ Could be slightly more. Due to the absence of some information, the study could not establish the total membership for the BAAC.

key-informants interviewed for this study had been close to their respective collective action organizations since their inception.

4.4.2. Membership of the collective action organizations

The study found that membership of the four collective action organizations targeted by this study was institution-based. Recruitment of members was done through invitation from the organizers to the selected institutions which in turn appointed a representative. Institutions interested in membership could also apply, and if they met a prescribed eligibility criterion, they could be admitted. According to the organizers interviewed in this study, this mode of recruitment was adopted to maintain a small manageable group which was relevant to the central issues of the collective action organization and could, therefore, be focused and active.

4.4.3. Formation, management structure and operations

The four organizations followed a similar trajectory in how their collective action effort commenced, as illustrated below.

Figure 1: Summary of evolution pattern for the collective action organizations



A secretariat housed by the organizing institution run the operations of each of the four collective action organizations. Only one of the four organizations, COSTI, had a dedicated full-time secretariat with permanent staff while the rest had secretariats on a part-time basis.

Donor agencies were the primary supporters of the activities and bore a significant proportion of the transaction costs of the four collective action organizations. However, host institutions contributed to the cost of running the organizations. BAAC also had a subscription-based membership arrangement as a way of raising resources to supplement donor financing. The subscription from paying members ranged from US\$5,000 to US\$10,000

per annum. However, it was still not enough to subsidize the running costs of the initiative due to the low membership base.

Members' contribution to the collective action organization was mainly in the form of institutional and legal mandates which their organizations had. This was particularly the case with public sector institutions. Besides, the influence or clout which some umbrella bodies had, such as civil society organizations, the private sector, and the media, was also considered an essential contribution to the collective action efforts. The constituency reach which some of the members had, such as civil society networks and media bodies, was also considered a vital contribution. These were considered critical as they could be leveraged to get collective action effort done and achieve critical milestones.


Despite some moderate fluctuations in membership, the organizations had an overall stable membership and representation during the period of their existence. None of the organizations had any formal negative incentives, e.g., sanctions as a way of encouraging active participation or penalizing poor participation. Participation in these organizations was mostly voluntary and based on goodwill.

The focus was very much on using positive incentives to encourage active participation. The central assumption was that members who did not actively participate automatically denied themselves access to most of the incentives

since they could only access them through active participation in meetings and activities of the organizations.

4.4.4. Sector representation on the collective action organization

Graph 1: Sector representation in the collective action organizations



Participation of the public sector was dominant relative to other sectors in three (3) out of the four (4) collective action organizations, both at the membership and secretariat levels. Out of the twenty-four (24) members of these organizations interviewed, eleven (11) represented a range of public agencies, from central government to parastatals (public companies). Seven (7) represented various civil society organizations. These included civil society networks and umbrella bodies. Two (2) were from the media, mainly from umbrella bodies, four (4) were from the private sector. Public sector dominance is largely due to its size relative to other sectors in Malawi. In addition, it is key in most of the public issues, particularly those around

which the collective action organizations were organized. The summary of sector representation per collective action organization was as follows:

Table 2: Sectors per collective action organization

Collective action Organization	Number of Member Sectors	Sectors Represented
NIC	4	Civil society, the media, public sector, private sector
BAAC	3	Civil society, private sector, public sector
IACCWC	3	Public sector, civil society, the media
COSTI	4	Public sector, the media, civil society, private sector

Members of these collective action organizations who were interviewed for this study were of middle to senior ranking in their respective organizations. The collective action organizations did not have a fixed lifespan within which it was expected to operate and achieve its desired goals.

4.5. Detailed results of the study

4.5.1. Incentive structures in the collective action organizations

Chapter 2 defined incentive structures as a collection or set of incentives or benefits that members can access in their respective collective action organizations in exchange for participating. The chapter also discussed the typology for classifying different types of incentives originally promulgated by Wilson which Johnston and Kpundeh built on in their study of Ghana and India.¹¹⁴ These include: material incentives which refer to those that relate to the rewards of tangible value, purposive which relate to the accomplishment of a significant goal, specific solidarity incentives which relate to intangible rewards arising out of the act of associating, and finally, collective solidarity incentives which relate to intangible rewards enjoyed by a group that is created by the act of associating.¹¹⁵ This typology was used to illustrate incentive structures in the collective action organizations based on what the respondents said.

Respondents from the three groups were asked to explain what incentives they stood to gain in exchange for participating in their respective anti-corruption collective action organizations. The study found that based on what they highlighted, the incentive structures in the collective action organizations had the following characteristics:

¹¹⁴ Johnston and Kpundeh, *Building a clean machine*, 9.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

- a) They constituted a diverse range and mix of incentives which included incentives that were tangible and intangible.
- b) Purposive incentives were the dominant incentive type.
- c) The four organizations documented only a few of the incentives mentioned. Most of the incentives were therefore informal.
- d) The organizations mostly documented material incentives such as honoraria where it was applicable, discounts to training events for paying members and fuel refunds, which they provided under some form of quasi-contractual arrangements.
- e) The range of incentives did not change over the course of the existence of the collective action organization.
- f) The incentives offered or available in these organizations were mostly open and accessible to all members. The study found that 87% (20 out of 24) of the stakeholders indicated this.
- g) In some cases, incentives were limited due to demand and supply factors. Incentives such as capacity building and international exposure opportunities fell into this category.
- h) There were a few selective incentives but these were limited to one organization which restricted some material incentives to paid up members only. These included discounts and guaranteed participation in trainings provided.

The full list of incentives is given below in Table 3 and categorized according to the groups of respondents.


**Table 3: Consolidated List of incentives cited by members, organizers and critical informants
of the collective action organizations**

Incentive Category	Incentives that Stakeholders Said They Saw	Incentives that Organizers Said Were Available	Incentives that Key Informants Said Were Available
Material Incentives	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Capacity building opportunities through the training opportunities that the organization would offer 2. Opportunity to gain international exposure 3. Access to a network of business that would translate into more business 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Financial incentives such as honoraria, sitting allowance during meetings, fuel refunds provided to those who attend meetings 2. Capacity building opportunities to enhance knowledge and skills 3. Exposure which could be through meeting stakeholders, especially outside the country 4. Priority consideration whenever certification training opportunities that had limited space came up 5. Exclusive discounts for paying members for training 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Honoraria, fuel refunds, sitting allowance 2. Capacity building 3. Services provided by the collective action organization
Purposive Incentives	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Contribution to national cause 2. Access to relevant information and knowledge on issues relating to the focus area 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enhance profile/reputation 2. Show solidarity 3. Gain international recognition 4. Gain national recognition 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Participation benefitted some stakeholders by safeguarding resources they provide to the concerned sector

	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Shared learning 4. Recognition or prestige for being part of a nationally recognized platform 5. Collaboration with other stakeholders to document and disseminate information for public consumption 6. Contribution to lobbying efforts with other stakeholders to secure changes to crucial legislation 7. Contribution to enhancement of government accountability 8. Securing improved efficiencies in the private sector 9. Contribution to leveling the playing field in the business sector 10. Contribution to creation of conditions where companies will be competing based on efficiency 11. Promote clean business in the private sector 12. Knowledge enhancement on the issues at the core of the collective effort 13. Information sharing with other stakeholders 14. Networking opportunities with other stakeholders 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Contribute to securing increased transparency in Malawi 6. Contribution to securing improved quality of infrastructure due to transparency 7. Opportunity to help secure improved service due to better quality infrastructure 8. Networking opportunities 9. Contribution to a national cause 10. Opportunity to gain respect as champions of anti-corruption 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Participation facilitated promotion of efficiency in service delivery concerning costs and time 3. It also enhanced their reputation that they do not condone corruption and mediocrity 4. Stakeholders could benefit from the information shared during the meetings of the organization. This information could be in the form of updates, policy developments, operational matters, best practices, just to mention a few 5. Stakeholders expected the collective action organization to have more political impact and influence policy and action by the government on corruption since corruption is prevalent in the public sector 4. Knowledge, expertise and skills they gained
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
	<p>15. Opportunity to contribute to the eradication of corruption in Malawi</p> <p>16. Access to knowledge which they could, in turn, pass on to community level structures</p>		
Specific Solidarity Incentives	<p>1. Securing a place in the governance equation</p> <p>2. Opportunity to gain prestige</p>		
Collective solidarity Incentives	<p>1. Satisfaction derived from results of collective effort to solve a national problem</p>		

Graph 2: Incentive types per respondent group




The results underscore the observation made earlier that purposive incentives were the dominant type of incentives in the incentive structures for the four organizations, followed by material incentives.

Graph 3: Incentives perceived by the three groups of respondents



Overall, stakeholders saw a wide range of incentives offered by the collective action organization in exchange for their participation compared to the incentives which organizers and key informants cited as being on offer.

Graph 4: Were incentives explained during invitation?



The study sought to establish whether incentives offered were explained by the organizers when members were being invited to join. The purpose of this question was to ascertain the extent to which organizers use incentives offered by their collective action organization to encourage stakeholders to sign up and participate.

The study found that in only 38% (9 out of 24) of the cases, organizers explained incentives offered to members at the time they were being invited. The rest said that the organizers did not explain incentives at the time they

were joining, or they figured out themselves how they could benefit from a collective action.

Out of the five (5) organizers, three (3) indicated that organizers explained the incentives while two (2) indicated that in some cases, organizers explained the incentives and in other cases, they did not. An analysis of invitation letters that were sent to some of the members indicated that only a limited number of incentives, and mostly material incentives, were explained, albeit in an implicit way.

This result shows that organizers did not rely much on using incentive structures to lure stakeholders to sign up and participate in their respective collective action organizations but stakeholders still considered what incentives could accrue to their organizations or sectors in exchange for their participation.


4.6. Influencing factors for participation and the role of incentives

The major theories cited in the opening paragraph of this chapter, i.e., the group theory and the Olson theory of collective action, suggest two different explanations as to what influences individuals to cooperate in collective action. The group theory emphasizes common interests and perceived benefits of cooperation and Olson's theory suggest selective incentives as a key influencing factor.

4.6.1. Key factors that influenced participation of stakeholders

Stakeholders were asked to explain *why they decided to participate in their respective collective action organizations.*

Graph 6: Factors influencing participation in collective action



The respondents cited a range of reasons why they signed up to participate in the anti-corruption collective action organizations. From the range of reasons given, patterns were identified through analysis and grouped together. A total of twenty-two (22) factors were identified. The full list is in Appendix 2.

The study found that in 72% (16 out of 22) of the cases, the factors cited by stakeholders were incentive-related, i.e., there was a close association with the incentives which the stakeholders later cited as being influential in their decision to participate. See Graph 6 above. Of these, 41% (9 out of 22) were purposive, 23% (5 out of 22) were collective solidarity in nature, and 9% (2 out of 22) were material in nature.

The study also found that members cited other factors. These factors were not related to incentives. These respondents included 14% who stated that conviction or passion of the member institution on the issue which the collective effort was addressing influenced their participation. Some respondents indicated that they had a keen interest in governance issues and that is what drew them to the collective action effort.

Another respondent cited firm belief that joint efforts were a better way of solving the issue which was the focus of the collective action effort. The study also found that 14% cited affinity with the issue as something that drew their organization into the effort. The affinity was primarily a result of the legal mandate of their institution which aligned with the core issues of the collective action organizations.


Key informants, on the other hand, cited factors that were incentive related when they were asked to explain what they considered to be the pull factors that drew stakeholders to the collective action organizations. In summary, they cited among others that stakeholders:

- a) Were excited about the idea of a collaborative action to improve the business environment in which their companies operate
- b) Wanted to engage with the tools that the collective action organization was developing in cooperation with member firms
- c) Were interested in the services provided by the collective action organization and these included capacity building
- d) Had committed leadership in the institutions they were representing
- e) Perceived benefits, including financial ones, which they saw as emanating from their attendance
- f) Had an apparent personal and professional interest in the issue which the collective action organization was addressing
- g) Felt that having been invited, they were mandated to attend by their agency.

This finding indicated that amongst the various factors that lured stakeholders to participate in the collective action, incentives were a major influencing factor. However, other factors had a limited role in influencing stakeholders.

4.6.2. The role of incentives in the decision to participate

Graph 7: Did incentives influence participation?



The study asked stakeholders whether incentives which they anticipated to accrue to them for participating in the collective action organization influenced their decision to participate in collective action efforts. In 88% (21 out of 24) of the cases, stakeholders stated that they were influenced by the incentives to participate. This underscored the influencing factors for participation that were highlighted as findings in the previous question.

4.6.3. Incentive preference by various sectors

Stakeholders were grouped into four categories according to their sector of interest (i.e., civil society organizations, the private sector, the public sector, and the media). When the responses were analysed based on this grouping,

the study found that each stakeholder group had certain incentive types that in peculiar primarily influenced their decision to participate. The analysis was based on the questions, "What incentives did they expect to get from their participation in collective action?" and "Whether these incentives influenced their participation?"

The analysis revealed that civil society organizations were primarily influenced by incentives such as knowledge, networking opportunities and shared learning that they could gain from participating. The private sector was influenced by incentives such as opportunities to ensure fair competition, securing a level playing field in conducting business, improved efficiency to be derived from the success of what the collective action was trying to establish, and expansion of business opportunities through networking with other organizations in the group. The public sector organizations were influenced by opportunities for capacity building and enhancement of skills and exposure. Finally, the media highlighted incentives such as an opportunity to use the collective action organization as a platform to lobby for other issues of concern to their sector related to the core issues championed by the collective action efforts. They also cited opportunities to gain information which they could then disseminate.

In summary, this analysis illustrates that civil society is interested in seeking knowledge and networks from their engagement with other stakeholders in anti-corruption collective action efforts. The private sector, on the other hand, seeks to leverage the collective efforts to improve the operating


environment for their businesses. This finding concerning the private sector responds to the concerns raised in the findings of the Governance and Corruption Survey of 2013 by the private sector, which found that 63% of the businesses in Malawi cited corruption as a constraint to their business operations.¹¹⁶ The public sector seeks to develop their response capacity to the problems which the anti-corruption collective action organization helps to address. The media seeks information which they could then disseminate and leverage the collective effort to pursue other issues.

This observation reveals that while stakeholders may cooperate in an anti-corruption effort, they are driven by the pursuit of different interests and seek to reap different benefits in pursuit of the collective goal. Some of the stakeholders may be driven more by interests that lie beyond what the collective action efforts seek to achieve.

¹¹⁶ Chinsinga et al., *Governance and corruption survey*, 33.

4.6.4. Why anticipation of incentives influenced participation?

Graph 8: Types of incentives which influenced participation



Stakeholders were also asked to explain why the incentives influenced their decision to participate. An analysis of their responses indicated that 76% (13 out of 17) of the responses given related to purposive incentives in contrast to other incentive types. For example, one member explained that "participation was providing them an opportunity to influence governance and public policy, and to raise their profile and be seen to be contributing to tackling a national problem." This finding reinforces earlier observations by this study that purposive ends significantly influenced most stakeholders to sign up and participate in the anti-corruption collective action organizations.

The study found that in 12% (2 out of 17) of the cases, members proffered other explanations that did not relate to incentives. One member, for example, cited that "they were motivated to share their long experience


which they had in finding solutions to the problem that the collective action organization was addressing." This finding underscores the fact that whilst incentives were significant in influencing participation, they did not exclusively play this role as other subsequent findings will also demonstrate.

4.6.5. Participation levels of stakeholders and their influencing factors

Stakeholders were asked to describe their level of participation as well as the factors to which they attributed their level of participation. The study found that 96% (23 out of 24) described themselves as active participants in their respective collective action organizations.

However, based on further analysis of the responses, it was observed that participation was looked at from two perspectives by the stakeholders and the organizers. Some judged participation levels based on the regularity with which they attended meetings of the collective action organization. Others based it on their participation in the activities of the collective action organization which was a separate activity from the meetings. Organizers of the anti-corruption collective action organizations judged participation levels on the basis of how much contribution the stakeholders made to discussions on crucial issues which the collective action organization was pursuing, e.g., lobbying efforts to secure review of legislation.

Graph 9: Factors influencing active participation



When stakeholders were asked to explain factors that influence their active participation, they gave several reasons categorized below.

- a. **Incentives realized in exchange for participation** - 48% of the stakeholders (11 out of 23) fell into this group. They indicated that the realization of the incentives they had anticipated to get for participating in the collective effort was a key influencing factor for their level of participation.

- b. **The mandate of their organizations or a duty to the sectoral or interest group** - 35% of the stakeholders (8 out of 23) fell into this group. They were mainly government agencies. These had earlier indicated that they participated because they felt their legal mandate was relevant to

what the collective effort was trying to achieve. They hence felt duty bound to contribute.

Organizations that represented sectors or other interest groups felt that the sectors or interest groups whom they were representing expected them to remain active. This would ensure that they had a voice on the critical issues that the collective action organization was advancing.


- c. **The collective action organization itself** - 9% of the stakeholders (2 out of 23) fell into this group. These indicated that the collective action organization itself was organized and well run. They felt, therefore, that this provided the impetus for their level of participation.
- d. **Their attributes** - 9% of the stakeholders (2 out of 23) fell into this group. These attributed it to their commitment. They realized the significance of what was at stake. Their previous experience generated passion in them to be part of efforts to deal with the problem which the anti-corruption collective effort was addressing.

The study also found that out of the four key informants, two attributed participation of stakeholders in the collective action organizations to the influence of incentives. The other informants indicated that the linkage between the two is partial. Despite attributing the link between participation levels and incentives, they also expressed that other factors contributed to the participation levels.

One key informant, for instance, said, "Maybe not in the beginning [referring to the influence of incentives on active participation] but certainly, when we [referring to the collective action organization] became more visible and provided services on an ongoing basis, members linked participation to potential benefit. However, that was only one factor out of several...."¹¹⁷

4.6.6. Realisation of incentives by stakeholders

Graph 10: Realisation of incentives



The study asked stakeholders if the incentives they anticipated to get through participation in the collective action organization were realized. Most of the stakeholders, 91% (21 out of 24), indicated that they realized the incentives they had anticipated when joining. Only 9% (2 out of 24) said they did not realize the incentives. Stakeholders were further asked to explain

¹¹⁷ Interview with respondent no. R11K, 8 August 2017.

how the incentives were realized. A total of twenty-five (25) various explanations were given to justify their conclusions.

The explanations were consolidated and grouped to ascertain if different groups responded differently. The study observed a similar response pattern across the various sectors. An analysis of the responses indicates that in 72% (18 out of 25) of the explanations, members described realisation of incentives in terms of achievement of milestones or outputs which were quantifiable.

Public sector organizations, for example, mentioned that their organization accessed capacity building opportunities from the collective action organizations. They named capacity building (see Table 1) as what they anticipated as an incentive. Civil society organizations cited, for example, that they participated in scrutinizing public projects which helped to enhance transparency and accountability. They mentioned participation in enhancing transparency and accountability in government as an incentive they anticipated. The media cited facilitation of the development of anti-corruption strategies in media organizations.

The study found that in 28% (7 out of 25) of explanations, stakeholders cited milestones or outputs which are difficult to quantify. Public sector organizations, for example, mentioned enhancement of the image or reputation of their organizations as a result of their participation in the collective action organization. Civil society organizations named inclusivity

and participation by the collective action organization which they had experienced in pursuit of what they wanted to achieve. Private sector organizations, on the other hand, cited contribution of business specific experience to the collective effort as well as enhancement of accountability and transparency. These are not easily quantifiable when compared to capacity building opportunities or successful lobbying leading to the adoption of specific legislation.

4.7. Success or failure of the collective action organizations

Chapter 2 highlighted some of the scholarly debates around the issue of measuring the success or failure of collective action. It noted that the debate on this issue is still evolving and is therefore inconclusive. It further noted that much of what various scholars have propounded is in favor of measuring the success or failure to a large extent based on outputs.


The conclusion observed that there were few scholars who favored measuring success or failure based on outcomes. The challenges of measuring success at the impact level are due in large part to the difficulties associated with directly measuring corruption.

This study explored the issue of the success or failure of the collective action organizations mainly from a stakeholder's perspective. Of interest was the role which incentives play in influencing success or failure. Chapter 2 noted

that presently, no theoretical proposition had been offered to explain the influence of incentives in the success or failure of collective action efforts.

4.7.1. Members' assessment of the collective action organization

Graph 12: Views on success or failure of collective action



The study asked stakeholders whether they considered their respective collective action organizations to have succeeded or failed. Most of the respondents, i.e., 79% (19 out of 24), indicated that their collective action organization succeeded. About a fifth, i.e., 21% (5 out of 24), were either not sure or were of the view that there was partial success. Only one respondent indicated that their organization failed.

The study noted that those who rated their organizations as a success included members representing the first-generation collective action organizations, i.e., the NIC and the BAAC. The five members who did not rate

their organizations as successful all came from organizations that became dormant, i.e., the NIC and the BAAC. This meant that their rating of success or failure was not influenced by the fact that these collective action organizations did not survive for a long period to enable them achieve their objectives and mission. They rated their organizations based on achievements they made during the period they were in existence.

4.7.2. How members determined the success

The study found that none of the four organizations in the study had a well defined methodology for determining whether they were succeeding or failing, particularly whether they were making an impact. The study, however, found that one organization, the IACCWC, had developed a work plan which had activities with corresponding indicators and targets. These formed the basis for ascertaining performance and, therefore, success or failure.

It also found that another organization, the COSTI, conducts annual reviews of its progress. The COSTI has ongoing reporting arrangements with its funding agencies which also is a yardstick for gauging success or failure. However, when members were asked to explain how they measured success, they used a variety of bases to justify why they considered their respective collective action organization to have succeeded. Members used activity or process-based yardsticks or achievement of milestones to explain the success as opposed to using goals or impact as yardsticks.

Organizers, on the other hand, determined success by using the objectives of the collective action against which they were assessing if they had been achieved or not. They were illustrating achievements with examples. Four out of the five organizers interviewed used this approach. One organizer indicated that the objectives of the collective action organization were partially met.

In summary, from the nineteen (19) members who rated the collective action efforts they had been a part of as successful, three trends can be identified which were used to explain their rating of success:

- a) Some based their assessment on the achievement of identifiable milestones and objectives which their respective collective action either set out to do or accomplished. A total of 58% (11 out of 19) fell into this group. They cited, for example, training and other capacity building initiatives undertaken, and significant legislation that the collective action effort had successfully lobbied for and secured review.
- b) Others based their assessment of success on whether the institutions or sectors they were representing in the collective action organization had benefited in any tangible way as a result of their participation in the collective action organization. If they considered their organization to have benefited, they also concluded that the collective action organization had succeeded. They also elaborated the tangible ways in which their organization benefited that resulted in their assessment of success.

A total of 21% (4 out of 19) fell into this group. These, for example, cited improvement of governance processes in their organization as a result of their participation in a collective effort. One respondent explained that he reached this conclusion (i.e. of their respective collective action organization being successful), "concerning what we (his organization) benefitted from it (the collective action) and how it influenced the organization."¹¹⁸


- c) Yet another group used the benefits that the collective action effort had on the broader society because of its existence as a basis for arriving at their determination of success. A total of 21% (4 out of 19) fell into this group. One respondent said, "Malawi is fast becoming a shining star, but also procuring entities who were wary at first are becoming cooperative with assurance exercised. Stakeholders even in the community are raising flags, demanding the COSTI to intervene in certain projects."¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ Interview with respondent no. R1S, 17 July 2017

¹¹⁹ Interview with respondent no. R21S, 26 June 2017.

4.7.3. The role of incentives in explaining success or failure

Graph 13: The role of incentives in explaining success



Stakeholders were asked to explain the extent to which incentive structures could explain the success of their collective action organizations. The study found that 75% of the stakeholders (18 out of 24 respondents) indicated that it was to a great extent, while for 17% (4 out of 24 respondents) it was to some extent, and 8% (2 out of 24 respondents) said incentives did not contribute at all.

Those who said that incentives contributed to the success argued that the provision of incentives such as capacity building and networking, for example, enabled acquisition of knowledge and skills as well as pooling of stakeholder efforts which produced some of the successes which the organization achieved and this demonstrated a causal link.

One of the stakeholders in explaining his point said: "Because of the gains realized, we want to maintain them, so we actively participated."¹²⁰ A member of a different organization said, "Organizations see value in engaging with the COSTI. It is also a realization that pushing the agenda against corruption in the construction industry needs multiple players and collective force."¹²¹

Those who said that incentives contributed to the success only to some extent felt that success was largely due to the commitment of stakeholders as well as the host institutions for the collective action effort. One member commented that, "Generally, success was due to the commitment from the multi-stakeholder group members and host institution as well as political will."¹²² This was in reference to one of the collective action organizations which had a committed political champion. Others attributed it to the strategies that the collective action organization employed, which enabled members to be proactive.

Those who viewed incentives as not contributing at all to the success raised several issues. They cited inadequate financing of the collective action efforts. They argued that despite incentives being there, they could not rely on them alone to sustain the organization. They also cited the lack of a dedicated secretariat to run the operations of the organizations since the scope of its terms of reference was huge.

¹²⁰ Interview with respondent no. R6S, 18 July 2017.

¹²¹ Interview with respondent no. R19S, 13 June 2017.

¹²² Interview with respondent no. R21S, 26 June 2017.

They further cited political interference with the collective action effort and an apparent lack of commitment or political will from the government in the later stages of the effort that undermined it. They argued that these factors overshadowed whatever influence incentives had in contributing to the success and sustainability of the organization.

On the part of the organizers, two of them expressed the view that incentives contributed to the success of their organizations while organizers for the other two indicated that they did not think incentives contributed.

Failure of the two collective action organizations to achieve their long-term goals was, however, attributed to other factors and not incentives. In other words, incentives did not have a role to play. The main factors mentioned by stakeholders include the lack of a stable structure to provide a secure foundation to support the collective action effort, human and financial resources challenges, and the lack of commitment from the government. They also cited limited ownership of the strategy by members of the organization, poor communication, lack of broader stakeholder involvement, and complexity of the issues that were being tackled by the collective action organization, mainly corruption.

On the part of the key informants, two out of the three who responded to this question said incentives contributed to the success of the collective action organization only to some extent. One respondent said incentives

contributed to a great extent. From their explanation of this question, they mostly felt that much as incentives were a significant factor, there was a broad range of factors that contributed to success.

The overall picture presented by responses from the three groups was that incentives did significantly contribute to the success of the collective action organizations. However, other factors also played a notable role. This, however, is based on success being measured mainly at the output level as illustrated by the findings.

4.7.4. Other factors that contributed to success or failure

When members were asked to explain factors that contributed to the success or failure of their anti-corruption collective action organization, they cited several factors. The respondents attributed success or failure to both internal and external factors. The study found that 71% (17 out of 24) cited internal factors related to the collective action organization as contributing to the success. These included the commitment of members of the group, good leadership and coordination by the secretariat and host institution, and strategies employed by the organization, such as involvement of mass media in some of their activities which facilitated public engagement.

Only 8% (2 out of 24) cited external factors as contributing to the success of the organization. These were, for example, financial and technical support as well as political will and significant public support. Another 13% (3 out of 24)

had indicated that they were not sure, the anti-corruption collective action organization had limited success, or they did not commit to a precise position. The rest had indicated that the collective action organization had failed.

Members who considered their collective action organizations to have failed or had limited success or were not sure cited inadequate financial and technical support and the lack of political will as factors to which they imputed the failure of their anti-corruption collective action organization.

4.8. Conclusion

This chapter presented the results of the study based on the research question and objectives. It has also presented the results of the hypothesis testing based on the evidence gathered by the study. The results have shown that the incentive structures in the organizations studied are credible and diverse. They exert substantial influence on stakeholder participation as well as sustaining the collective action efforts and contributing to their success. The results have also shown that incentives did not influence failure of those collective action efforts that floundered.

They have further shown that despite the collective action organizations which were studied being considered successful, they did not have a well-defined mechanism for assessing the impact of their effort. They also reveal

that mobilization of stakeholders for anti-corruption collective efforts is mostly institution based.

The next chapter will discuss these findings and relate them to the theoretical and scholarly propositions that were discussed in Chapter 2.

5. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

5.1. Introduction

This chapter will discuss the results of the study that were presented in the preceding chapter. The discussion will relate the findings to the research question and the scholarly debates discussed in Chapter 2.

The key findings of the study presented in the preceding chapter are summarized and discussed as follows:

5.1.1. Do incentives influence stakeholder's decision to participate?

The study has established that incentives offered by anti-corruption collective action organizations substantially influence stakeholders' decision to participate in collective action organizations. It has further established that amongst the incentive types offered by these organizations, purposive incentives are the dominant incentive type and exerted the most influence on stakeholder's decision to participate. The study has also found that the influence of incentives extends beyond stakeholder's decision to sign up. However, it has observed that other factors are more influential in determining success, failure, and sustainability of the anti-corruption collective action in addition to incentives.

These findings support the core proposition of Olson's theory in which he argues that incentives are crucial to getting rational individuals to collaborate. However, the concurrence with Olson's theory is limited because there is contrast with some elements of Olson's arguments, mainly his reference to selective incentives.

Despite the incentives offered by the four collective action organizations in this study being primarily open, they nevertheless influenced the decision to participate substantially. Olson's theory was based on individual participation in collective action, while participation in the anti-corruption collective action organizations targeted by this study was institution-based as much as individuals represented the member institutions. The evidence in this study suggests that the nature of the membership may have been crucial in influencing participation.

Despite the contrast with Olson's theory, the selectivity in the incentive structures for the organizations in this study was on access to the incentives by members as opposed to inducing members to sign up and participate. The nature of most of the incentives meant that accessing them was based on participation in meetings and activities of the collective organization. Absenting oneself meant that one could automatically not enjoy most of these incentives, including most of the material ones.

The differences in incentive arrangements between the organizations in this study and the theoretical arguments made by Olson and others illustrate an

alternative way for organizing collective action and attracting participation. They underscore the fact that the context and nature of the problem being addressed determines the structure of the anti-corruption collective action. In other words, Olson's proposition may be just one of the many ways to explain how collective action efforts would evolve.

The findings also illustrate that the influence of incentives is fundamentally not diminished in collective action contexts that are institution-based, i.e., where institutions are purposely selected based on their relevance to the cause and legal mandates they can bring to the collective action. Even in the context of collective action that has an institution-based membership, the decision to participate is induced by incentives which the collective action organization offers in exchange for their participation.

The influence of other factors apart from incentives on the stakeholder's decision to participate in anti-corruption collective action substantiates the group theorists' argument that common purpose and perceived benefits from cooperation influence individuals to collaborate.¹²³

The factors cited by some stakeholders, such as the relevance of their institution's legal mandates as well as areas of the institution's focus and how these exerted influence on their decision to participate, supports the core arguments of group theorists discussed in Chapter 2 on what causes

¹²³ Sarah Gillinson, *Why cooperate? A multi-disciplinary study of collective action*, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2004, 8, accessed Sept 11, 2016, <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2472.pdf>.

collective action to happen. However, the findings clearly show that these were not adequate in themselves to cause these collective action efforts to take off.

The range of other influencing factors for stakeholder participation which the study has established is consistent with some of the other theoretical propositions discussed in Chapter 2 apart from those by Olson and the group theorists. These include Chong and the utilitarian paradigm school of thought. Chong highlights reputation enhancement as a factor that influences stakeholders to pursue collective action.¹²⁴ The utilitarian paradigm later cites the value of the public good and the potential success of collective action organization as factors that induce participation in collective action.¹²⁵

The study found that some of the incentives the stakeholders highlighted, such as enhancing their profile, gaining international recognition and opportunity to gain respect and contribution to a national cause, mirror those mentioned by these two schools of thought.

To sum up, the range of factors, including incentives that influenced stakeholder participation, underscore the conclusion cited in Chapter 2 that no single theoretical position can exclusively explain the occurrence of collective action because different individuals would be driven by different

¹²⁴ Passy, *Social and solidary incentives*, 2.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

factors to participate. In addition, collective action works differently in varying contexts.

5.1.2. Were the collective action organizations successful or a failure?

The study has established that the anti-corruption collective action organizations were successful. The intention of this study was not to delve deep into the issue of measuring success. The theoretical and scholarly debate on this issue is still evolving and lacks consensus. The finding that the collective action organizations were successful, however, is interesting and to some extent underscores the challenges of measuring the success of anti-corruption efforts which the current theoretical discourse has also acknowledged. In the case of first-generation anti-corruption collective action organizations which collapsed and did not achieve their overall goals, the finding of success is puzzling. Naturally, they would be considered to have failed because they collapsed before fully realising their objectives.

The finding that the organizers gave a mixed assessment underscores the divergence of the views and the inconclusive nature of the scholarly debate on the issue of how to measure the success of anti-corruption efforts. Those from organizations that collapsed did not fully endorse the fact that their organizations had succeeded, neither did they say it was a failure. The study observed that this assessment stemmed from how they perceived success. It is noted that success was perceived and measured differently amongst stakeholders, and between the stakeholders and the organizers.

The study has found that success was being measured at the output or activity level, and not ascertaining outcomes and impact that the activities of the collective action made over a period of time. It also found that at the current level for measuring success, different stakeholders and organizers used different yardsticks or bases to explain their conclusions of success. The study, however, found that in two of the organizations which are still active, there was some limited formal use of output indicators to track progress. This practice, as found by the study, is consistent with what Agrawal and Goyal suggested concerning the use of performance indicators which can then be tracked against set benchmarks to determine success or failure.¹²⁶

The observation of the study that success was mostly at the output and activity levels is still consistent with how the 2015 UN Global Compact study referred to in Chapter 2 illustrated success.¹²⁷ The use of different yardsticks to illustrate whether the collective action organization was successful or not as observed in the findings of this study is a result of a lack of a commonly agreed standard for measuring success in the collective action organizations. The stakeholders and organizers did not have consensus from the start of the collective action on what success would look like and how it would be measured.

¹²⁶ Agrawal Arun and Sanjeev Goyal, “*Group size and collective action: Third-party monitoring in common-pool resources*,” *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1, accessed Sept. 24, 2017, <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~arunagra/papers/Group%20Size%20and%20Collective%20Action.pdf>.

¹²⁷ UN Global Compact, *The case for cooperation*.

This observation is consistent with Nero's views discussed in Chapter 2 that there is still no consensus on how to define success and methods for measuring it amongst practitioners and academics.¹²⁸ This gap may also stem from a general problem that anti-corruption efforts face of assessing the impact of their efforts as explained by Doig et al. They observed that anti-corruption lacks a mechanism to measure not just performance of anti-corruption efforts but also success.¹²⁹ The lack of such a mechanism creates difficulties over time for the collective action organizations to convince the public and donors supporting them of their viability and relevance, and this negatively impacts their capacity to secure trust and confidence.

The study has found that success was explained in terms of latent and manifest functions of collective action organizations. These concepts were discussed in Chapter 2 and were coined by Merton. Based on stakeholder's assessment, the study found that success was explained based on how the stakeholder institutions benefited in exchange for their participation in the collective action. Secondly, others explained it based on what benefits accrued to society at large.

¹²⁸ William Nero, *Collective action: Evidence, experience and impact - a recap*, 2016, accessed Sept. 17, 2017, <https://www.collective-action.com/icarforum/blog/collective-action-evidence-experience-and-impact-recap>.

¹²⁹ Alain Doig, David Watt & Robert Williams, *Measuring success in five African anti-corruption commissions*, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2005, 40, accessed Sept 17, 2017, <https://www.u4.no/publications/measuring-success-in-five-african-anti-corruption-commissions/pdf>.

The findings suggest that stakeholders considered benefits to their institutions or to society to constitute achievements even if they were not prescribed as part of the objectives or goals. They still play a significant role. This assessment of success was based on the latent functions of the collective action organizations. The other explanations given, which based success on activities or outputs, constituted manifest functions.

5.1.3. Did incentives influence success or failure and sustainability?

The study has established that incentives substantially influenced the success of the collective action organizations. The UN Global Compact study referred to in Chapter 2 did not ascertain whether the collective action organizations it profiled were considered successful, as well as whether the incentives which they offered to their membership had any influence on their success. Most of the scholarly discussion highlighted in Chapter 2 did not dwell on the question of whether incentives influence the success or failure of collective action efforts. They dwell on looking at factors that influence the success or failure of collective action without explicitly addressing incentives as one such factor.

The study has, however, found that apart from incentives, there were other factors that contributed to the success of the collective action organizations. Interestingly, while incentives accounted for the success of the collective action, failure, on the other hand, was imputed to other factors. These included mainly political interference with the collective action effort and an

apparent lack of commitment or political will from the government in the later stages of the effort which undermined it.

The finding that failure was imputed to these factors was likely because these organizations had credible incentive structures. The study has also found that stakeholders realized the incentives they anticipated to get from participating in these organizations. This finding may, therefore, explain why they blamed other factors for the failure of their organizations. The factors cited by the stakeholders contrast with those cited by Ostrom as highlighted in Chapter 2. It could be argued, however, that the factors that influenced the failure or success of collective action organizations are specific to anti-corruption collective action while those cited by Ostrom are primarily generic and may apply to various other contexts.

The study has found that both internal factors that mainly touch on the quality of leadership, management and membership of the collective action, and external factors that relate to financial and technical support, as well as environmental factors such as political will and public support, contributed to the success of the collective action organizations. This study illustrates that other factors, in addition to incentives, influence the success of collective action efforts. The findings underscore the fact that incentive structures may not be adequate to guarantee success despite their significance.

The study has established that incentives offered by the collective action organization wield substantial influence in sustaining stakeholders'

participation in collective action efforts. However, it also found that other factors apart from incentives have a significant influence. The study found that the mandate that institutions have, particularly its relevance to the collective action cause, and the duty the stakeholders perceive they have to represent their membership, especially in the case of civil society organizations, to exert influence in sustaining stakeholders' participation.

In addition, the study has also established that how the collective action organization is organized and run, the commitment of its membership and stakeholders' realization of the significance of what was at stake are also crucial influence factors for sustainability of the collective action and influence active participation. Overall, the study has established that incentives are not a substantially dominant factor in influencing sustainability of the collective action when compared to other factors.

These findings illustrate that several other factors in addition to incentive structures influence participation levels of stakeholders after signing up for collective action. It also illustrates that incentive structures in themselves, while very influential, cannot exclusively guarantee sustainability of the collective action organizations.

5.2. Other key findings

5.2.1. Nature of membership of the collective action organization

The study has established that the collective action organizations had an institution-based membership. It observed that this approach enabled organizers to target institutions that have relevant mandates, requisite experience or the sizeable constituency reach. These factors were considered critical and could be leveraged by the collective action organization to achieve objectives or certain crucial milestones. It also ensures that the organization has a lean membership that is serious, focused and manageable. The contrast with Olson's arguments on selective incentives is that the collective action organizations in this study were selective on membership and not on incentives to attract membership.

This membership structure is consistent with other studies and typologies referred to earlier in Chapter 2 and appears to be the preferred model in anti-corruption collective action. The classification of collective action organizations highlighted by the Basel Institute on Governance as discussed in Chapter 2 is organized around institution-based membership. These include an anti-corruption declaration, standard setting or principles-based initiative and integrity pacts.¹³⁰ Most of the twelve national collective action organizations profiled in the UN Global Compact 2015 study discussed

¹³⁰ Basel Institute on Governance, *Collective Action/ICCA*, accessed Sept. 11, 2016, <https://www.baselgovernance.org/theme/icca>.

earlier, had similar membership structure.¹³¹ This approach to mobilizing and recruitment of membership is a viable alternative to individual recruitment. It is also an effective way of mitigating the "free riding" problem which Olson considered to be a major cause of failure of collective action. This approach, however, contrasts with using selective incentives as propounded also by Olson which, he said, was a solution to the "free riding" problem.¹³² While Olson argued that selective incentives mitigate the risk of free riding, this approach suggests that the risk of free riding can be mitigated by purposely selecting membership based on a predefined criterion.

Institution-based membership is a viable alternative to mobilizing stakeholder efforts compared to open membership, particularly in environments where corruption is highly pervasive such as Malawi. Models of anti-corruption collective action organizations that adopt open membership may risk attracting huge interest in participation because issues of corruption evoke a lot of passion and interest. This can result in a lot of people signing up, making the collective effort unmanageable, with a high risk of free riding and increased transaction costs.

Institution-based membership, on the other hand, in the case of the organizations studied, and invitation-based membership increase the chances of hedging against free riding substantially but not entirely. Institution-based membership was also found by the study to be a cost-effective way of managing the transaction costs of the collective action effort

¹³¹ UN Global Compact, *The case for cooperation*, 8.

¹³² Ibid.

since despite donor support, the organizations targeted by this study operated with limited resources.

The study, however, observed that institution-based collective action organizations lacked a robust mechanism to facilitate citizen engagement. The lack of public involvement creates a risk that the collective action organizations cannot have public support because citizens are not being engaged even in a limited way. As such, citizens don't feel they have a stake in the issues which the collective action organization is pursuing. The assumption is that civil society members who are part of these collective action organizations work with the public, but in most cases, they may not represent the full interests of the public regarding the issues being championed by the collective action organizations.

There has not been an attempt at anti-corruption collective action models that have an individual-based membership so far in Malawi and the region. However, there is still a place for them considering the prevalence of corruption, especially in public service delivery which directly victimizes citizens. The study observed that the four collective action organizations are more of an elite or national level coalitions.

Chapter 1 highlighted that Malawi has a significant corruption problem. There are other variants of corruption which manifest themselves at lower levels where they negatively affect the delivery of critical services and other state functions. Fighting them collectively, especially at a lower level, may

require collective action efforts that are configured to draw their membership and direct support from individuals or communities. Institution-based membership may not, therefore, be an ideal or flexible solution to deal with corruption in those circumstances.

5.2.2. Incentive Structures in the collective action organizations

The study has established that the collective action organizations have incentive structures which are largely credible. In Chapter 2, credible incentive structures were described as those that stakeholders consider adequate and can facilitate getting a collective action effort off the ground and then sustain it and influence its success. The incentive structures in the four organizations in this study influenced stakeholder participation as well as contributed towards the success and sustainability of the collective action effort. In the case of the first generation collective action organizations, the sustainability was for the period in which they existed.

The study has also found that the incentive structures are diverse with a mix of incentive types. It has further found that those incentives perceived by stakeholders to be offered by the collective action organization had greater influence on their decision to participate. The study has also found that purposive incentives were the dominant incentive type within the incentive structures.

The finding on the mix and diverse nature of the incentive structures in the collective action organizations supports conclusions by Knoke and also those of Johnston and Kpundeh. Knoke in his study, which did not target anti-corruption collective action, concluded that collective action organizations are not restricted to a single type of incentive, but may offer a range of incentives simultaneously to attract diverse members and maintain current ones.¹³³ Johnston and Kpundeh, on the other hand, observed that purposive incentives are dominant in anti-corruption coalitions but that most organizations have a diverse range of incentives that can appeal to various groups.¹³⁴ This observation implies that while incentive structures may be diverse, purposive incentives are the dominant incentive type in anti-corruption collective action organizations.

There is consistency in the findings on the diversity of incentives and the dominance of purposive incentives, and what Johnston and Kpundeh found in their study. However, this study found a more extensive range than what Johnston and Kpundeh found in their work. There are also contrasts between the findings in the two studies on observations which Johnston and Kpundeh made regarding how incentives transition over time from one type to another as the coalition evolves from the formation phase through the credibility phase and expansion to the transformation phase.¹³⁵ From this study, the view espoused by organizers was that the range of the incentives they

¹³³ David Knoke, *Organizing for collective action*, 107.

¹³⁴ Johnston and Kpundeh, *Building a clean machine*, 14-15.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

mentioned remained mostly the same over the period in which the collective action organization operated.

What is also striking is that stakeholders perceived a more extensive range of incentives offered than those which organizers stated that the organization offered. The study also observed that different stakeholders preferred different types of incentives, even within the same category. Though the organizations in this study had an institution-based membership, this observation concurs well with Knoke's conclusion on the diversity of incentives discussed earlier. What can be concluded from these results is that what matters to stakeholders is the incentives they perceive as accruing to them for participating and not necessarily what the organization claims to offer.

An analysis of the findings by this study on the incentives that were peculiar to each group of the stakeholders suggests that in designing incentive structures, organizers should focus on what would appeal to each stakeholder group based on their background and what interests the various sectors.

What is more intriguing from the findings is that there is a wide range of incentives that stakeholders stand to gain from participating in anti-corruption collective efforts despite the risks and difficulties in some environments associated with anti-corruption work. Stakeholders are

significantly driven by purposive ends to participate in anti-corruption collective action.

This observation is a departure from the conclusions by Johnston and Kpundeh who argue in their paper that owing to the risks associated with fighting corruption, purposive incentives may not be credible in the first place and that a movement that relies on them too much may eventually experience low commitment, conflicts over strategy and vulnerability to outside events.¹³⁶

The contradiction with Johnston's conclusions, however, may stem from the fact that the risks associated with fighting corruption vary from context to context and may also depend on what kind of corruption issues the collective action is tackling. Some corruption issues may be riskier to deal with than others. For example, collective action organizations that focus on issues that are linked to political corruption in highly corrupt environments will face a higher risk than those whose focus is on issues linked to corruption of a purely administrative nature. It is possible that most of the collective action organizations in this study or the environment deal with issues that are less risky, in which case Johnston and Kpundeh conclusion may not be applicable to this context.

Besides the study finding that purposive incentives are dominant, the eventual collapse of the first generation of collective action organizations did

¹³⁶ Johnston and Kpundeh, *Building a clean machine*, 14-15.

not arise from reliance on purposive incentives but from other factors. Johnston and Kpundeh assertion, therefore, about vulnerability of the collective action organization to external events is not entirely inapplicable to the context of this study. It may partly explain why the first generation of collective action organizations eventually collapsed. The study has found, for instance, that external factors such as political interference and the lack of seriousness in the leadership at the government level, were influential in the collapse of the first generation of anti-corruption efforts.

5.3. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the key findings from the study in light of the theoretical and scholarly propositions presented in Chapter 2. What is clear is that while there is a convergence between some findings by this study with theoretical and scholarly propositions discussed earlier in Chapter 2, there are variations as well. The next chapter will conclude and suggests recommendations and further areas of possible research.

6. CONCLUSION

6.1. Introduction

This chapter presents conclusions to this study. It will also propose recommendations based on what the study has found and will further highlight some limitations of this study. As an outgrowth of this study, it will also suggest possible areas for further research.

The primary objective which this study sought to establish is the extent to which incentives offered by anti-corruption collective action organizations influence stakeholders to participate in anti-corruption collective action. Further, it sought to establish whether the incentives account for the success or failure and sustainability of the anti-corruption collective action organizations. The study selected four anti-corruption collective action organizations. Data was collected from stakeholders who are members of these organizations, the organizers who host these organizations, and those who support these organizations technically and financially. Secondary sources also supplemented the data that was collected through interviews. The findings were presented in Chapter 4 and discussed in Chapter 5.

6.2. Key conclusions of the study

The findings and the discussion in the preceding two chapters lead to the following conclusions:

- a) Incentive structures in anti-corruption collective action organizations exert a significant influence on stakeholder's decision to sign up and participate in anti-corruption collective action as long as they are credible and diverse. Incentives also substantially influence the success of collective action efforts and sustains them at least in the short term. However, despite their credibility, they cannot guarantee long-term sustainability of anti-corruption collective action organizations because other critical factors are also key in determining this. Failure of an anti-corruption collective action organization is not influenced in any way by incentive structures that are credible.

- b) In spite of the risks that are often associated with fighting corruption, particularly in environments where corruption is pervasive, the evidence found by this study shows that where credible incentive structures exist, they have the capacity to attract participation of stakeholders. Purposive incentives play a significant role in attracting stakeholder participation in anti-corruption collective action causes in comparison to other incentive types. Despite incentives' capacity in helping collective action achieve only short-term sustainability, credible incentive structures nevertheless provide an opportunity for organizers to leverage incentives in

combination with other factors to harness multi-stakeholder efforts to address corruption.

- c) Despite challenges associated with developing reliable ways of ascertaining the impact of anti-corruption efforts, collective action organizations nevertheless are able to demonstrate some level of success from their effort, albeit to a limited extent. Reliance is placed on measuring success or failure at the output or activity level. Challenges, however, still exist despite the growing popularity of anti-corruption collective action as a tool for harnessing multi-stakeholder efforts. No effective mechanism exists at a practical level to effectively ascertain the impact of anti-corruption collective action.

- d) Institution-based membership is the most preferred option for mobilizing stakeholder anti-corruption collective action efforts. However, while it effectively mitigates specific risks inherent in anti-corruption collective action efforts, it does not guarantee long-term sustainability of the collective action effort. It is only useful in tackling variants of corruption that require high-level multi-stakeholder collaboration. It may be effective in addressing some variants of corruption but perhaps not all, especially low-level administrative forms of corruption which, though they are traditionally treated as petty, victimize large sections of the population in third world environments with high pervasiveness of corruption like Malawi.

6.3. Recommendations

There are several issues revealed by the study that need to be addressed to enhance the value that collective action can add to anti-corruption efforts. The following are some of the suggested recommendations:

- a) **Collective action organizations need to design effective mechanisms that facilitate some level of citizen participation.**

Citizens are the ultimate victims of most of the corruption in third world environments which collective action organizations collaborate to address. They are also potential beneficiaries of a corruption free society which collective action efforts aim to bring about. This benefit will accrue to them regardless of the level of implementation of the collective action efforts, i.e., whether it is high-level collective efforts, as was the case in the four organizations under study, or low-level efforts involving citizen mobilization.

Developing a detailed strategy to secure some level of participation by citizen groups can help to facilitate their active support. It cannot be assumed that participation of civil society organizations in the collective action represents citizens' interests. Citizen involvement can also help to ensure synchronization of collective efforts with citizens' expectations. This can generate broad support for the collective action effort which guarantees long-term sustainability of the collective action.

b) Anti-corruption collective action organizations need to have defined and practical mechanisms for measuring and showcasing their impact.

Much of the issue on how collective action organizations can measure and showcase the impact they are making beyond their current reliance on output-based measures is still under debate. Such mechanisms, especially involving anti-corruption efforts, must be context-based. The use of different yardsticks, as observed by the study, to determine success is problematic.

The mechanisms must be quantifiable to facilitate dependable verification and to make it easy to showcase results to the public and other stakeholders. This helps to secure their trust and confidence in the collective action. Developing measurement mechanisms, including tools that would reliably measure whether success is being achieved, especially at the outcome and impact level, would also generate interest from other potential funders or supporters beyond what they have, and enhance citizens trust.

c) Collective action organizations should have sustainability plans right from the start.

Much as donor support has enabled most of these organizations to achieve significant milestones in Malawi, it is not a sustainable way of supporting anti-corruption efforts. Anti-corruption efforts take time and often stretch beyond what donor agencies are willing to fund. In the study, the first

generation of collective action organizations failed, among other things, due to financial factors. The second generation organizations studied face the same conundrum. The efforts made by the COSTI to absorb some of the transactional costs and gradually mainstream its principles into laws and regulations are a case in point on what the anti-corruption collective action organizations need to be doing to enhance their chances of the sustainability of their efforts.

Financial sustainability is crucial since the study has established that despite the critical role that incentives have in sustaining collective action effort, they cannot in themselves guarantee long-term sustainability of the collective action organization.

d) Organizers of collective action efforts should enhance their capacity to better harness the considerable potential that incentive structures have.

Organizers of anti-corruption collective action should enhance their capacity to leverage the diversity of the range of incentives in their respective collective action organizations to add meaning and value to stakeholder participation. The finding by the study that organizers did not put enough emphasis on incentives during recruitment of members in spite of the influential role that incentive structures play, underscores the limited effort by organizers to leverage incentives in order to maximize the value they accrue to the collective effort.

There was less awareness on the part of the organizers about the significance of incentives. As such, there was not much effort to leverage nor formalize their incentive structures. Organizers emphasized material incentives, especially financial benefits, over other types of incentives whilst stakeholders valued purposive incentives.

6.4. Research limitations

The study has some inherent limitations which need to be acknowledged. Firstly, it only focussed on incentive structures and not the whole range of other possible factors that can explain stakeholder participation in collective action as well as the success or failure of collective action organizations. It, therefore, has only looked at part of a bigger picture as far as the factors that influence participation of stakeholders, and the success or failure and sustainability of collective action efforts is concerned. This limited focus, however, does not undermine the significance and role of incentive structures. The fact that incentives are at the center of theoretical debates on why collective action occurs underscores this point.

Secondly, the study targeted four collective action organizations whose activity areas include a focus on anti-corruption, whether directly or indirectly. Some of the findings of this study should, therefore, be generalized with caution to other collective action organizations as their application may be limited to the Malawi context in which the study was

undertaken. The relevance of the findings, however, cannot be discounted concerning their application particularly to environments with similar corruption levels and governance.

Lastly, time limitations imposed by the academic calendar restricted the scope of this study. It was also self-sponsored. These factors influenced the scope of the study, and hence the extent and depth to which some issues were explored.

6.5. Strengths of the research

The study is the first attempt that has been made to focus on anti-corruption collective action in the Malawian context. With the high level of corruption that Malawi has and the efforts that are being made to counter corruption, the study is ground-breaking because it potentially contributes significant new knowledge to understanding collective action, which is a growing and an increasingly popular anti-corruption tool. It has shed some light on what role incentives play and thus bridging the gap between theory and reality on this critical issue which influence collective action efforts.

It has also ventured into additional areas such as the influence of incentives on the success or failure and sustaining collective action efforts which are not yet in the spotlight of existing theoretical and scholarly debates and empirical studies. The study has also contributed significant practical knowledge based on first-hand information on what range of incentives anti-

corruption collective action organizations offer and how they can be harnessed to sustain and spur collective action efforts to success.

6.6. Areas of possible further research

There are more areas within the subject area of anti-corruption collective action in Malawi and beyond that are yet to be explored, as attested to by the dearth of empirical studies as observed in Chapter 1.

Firstly, within the specific area in which this study dwelt, there are still other issues that may be worth exploring further. These include exploring sustainable anti-corruption collective action models that can work in third world contexts such as Malawi. This suggestion follows the finding that existing and past collective action organizations are over-reliant on external financing. The study found that as part of their efforts to reduce transaction costs, the collective action organizations were lean in terms of the size of their membership and staffed by part-time secretariats which were housed in host institutions. Despite these, their reliance on external financing exposes them to uncertainty which can arise from, among other factors, sudden shifts in donor focus areas. Alternative models suitable for third world environments like Malawi that are less dependent on external financing need, therefore, to be explored and proposed.

Secondly, the area of measuring the impact of anti-corruption collective action efforts is another area for research, considering that it is still evolving and this study has flagged it as a grey area. Possible studies can, for instance, explore how collective action in other fields within Malawi and beyond measure their impact, what lessons anti-corruption collective action can learn from those, and what can be applied or modified for application to ensure that collective action organizations can efficiently and reliably showcase the impact of their work.

Finally, this study has also noted that since the advent of anti-corruption efforts in Malawi in 1995, collective action efforts draw their membership from selected institutions deemed relevant by the organizers. None has so far attempted individual-based membership at any level. It would be critical to study why, despite citizens open and passionate rejection of corruption, attempts to mobilize them into collective action have proven difficult or less preferred.

6.7. Conclusion

The primary motivation for doing this research was to contribute towards addressing the existing knowledge gap in understanding how anti-corruption collective action works in Malawi. Despite collective action progressively gaining currency as a tool for integrating multi-stakeholder efforts in tackling corruption, no empirical data exists that provides critical lessons that can continuously inform current and future collective action efforts to make them

more efficient. The lack of empirical data to explain why people join anti-corruption collective action efforts, what sustains these efforts and what can make them fail or succeed was one of the gaps cited in the opening chapters.

Based on the findings presented and followed by their discussion, and the conclusions drawn in this chapter, this study has competently and seriously addressed these issues. It has provided empirical data that begin to address the gaps that were cited such as how anti-corruption collective action organizations are structured and why, how they have operated, what influenced various stakeholders to sign up and participate, whether they were a success and what sustained them, and why they collapsed. It has also shed light on potential areas where existing organizations potentially face the risk of going down the same route as their predecessors.

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8. APPENDIX 1. A brief profile of collective action organizations targeted in the study

The study selected four collective action organizations, namely, the National Integrity Committee (NIC), the Business Action Against Corruption (BAAC), the Interagency Committee for Combatting Wildlife Crimes (ICCWC), and the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (COSTI). The organizations are briefly described and profiled below.

1. The National Integrity Committee

This platform was formed following the launch of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy in 2009. It brought together eight sectors (referred to as “pillars” in the Strategy) which were considered key to the fight against corruption in Malawi. These included the public sector, the private sector, legislature, the judiciary, civil society, the media, faith-based organizations, and traditional leaders.

The sectors were represented on this platform by those formally appointed by the President. The National Integrity Committee was a national forum meant to discuss corruption issues and guide the smooth functioning of the NIS. Its goal was to harness stakeholder efforts to contribute to creating a corruption-free Malawi. Its mandate was to:

1. Draw indicators of progress in implementing the Strategy
2. Prioritize issues in the Strategy for implementation
3. Receive and analyse reports from stakeholders, i.e., the public sector, the media, civil society, and the private sector, on the implementation of the Strategy
4. Provide guidance to all stakeholders on the implementation of the Strategy
5. Report to the President and Cabinet every six months on the progress made in implementing the Strategy

6. Assess the impact of the Strategy and initiate its review to incorporate lessons learnt and adapt to the dynamic social, economic and political environment
7. Release annual progress reports to the public through the media and internet.

2. The Business Action Against Corruption

The Business Action Against Corruption was launched in 2005 with a view to provide a platform for private sector engagement in anti-corruption and other issues relating to corporate governance. It had a membership of 37 companies, mostly from the private sector. The BAAC also partnered with donor agencies, such as the Commonwealth Business Council (CBC) and the German Development Corporation (GIZ), and the public sector in its endeavors. Its primary goals were:

1. Facilitate development of a code of conduct
2. Organize annual training programs of ethics officers in ethics management
3. Conduct business symposia to offer opportunities for members to discuss critical issues relating to improving business environment
4. To develop tools such as the Business Code of Conduct and the Integrity Ratings Framework (a tool for measuring an institutional level of adherence to the Business Code of Conduct).¹³⁷

The BAAC has close links to the public sector through its collaboration with the Anti-Corruption Bureau. The National Anti-Corruption Strategy for Malawi (NACS) also recognizes the BAAC as the platform for private sector involvement in fighting corruption.

¹³⁷ Africa Institute of Corporate Citizenship, *Business Action against Corruption*, <http://www.aiccafrica.org/index.php/programmes/2012-11-07-21-00-15/2012-11-07-21-00-17>, accessed July 19, 2017.

3. The Interagency Committee for Combating Wildlife Crimes

This committee was established in 2014 in response to the escalating incidences of poaching and illegal wildlife trade. It was observed then that Malawi was being used as both the source and the transit route for illegal wildlife products, and corruption was a key driver. It is a multiagency and multi-stakeholder initiative comprising government agencies, the media and civil society. Its main goal is wildlife conservation. Its objectives are:

1. Strengthen collaboration and co-ordination among participating agencies
2. Advocate for review of wildlife legislation and other related pieces of legislation
3. Facilitate wildlife crimes awareness campaigns targeted at the public and other stakeholders
4. Facilitate investigations of wildlife cases
5. Facilitate and collaborate in timely prosecutions of wildlife cases
6. Advocate for the use of multiple laws in prosecution of wildlife cases
7. Facilitate gathering, collating and analysing of intelligence, and disseminate it to appropriate agencies
8. Develop and deliver training for enforcement agencies.¹³⁸

4. The Construction Sector Transparency Initiative

The Construction Sector Transparency Initiative is a country centered initiative whose goal is to promote transparency and accountability in the construction sector. COSTI aims to ensure that Government, stakeholders and the public get value for money in public construction projects.

¹³⁸ Shelley Waterland et al., *Illegal Wildlife Trade Review, Malawi*, Lilongwe Wildlife Trust, May 2015, S4.0, accessed July 19, 2017, <https://www.lilongwewildlife.org/wp-content/uploads/IWT-REPORT-FINAL.pdf>.

COSTI promotes public disclosure of information with the aim of enhancing accountability of procuring bodies and construction companies for the cost and quality of public-sector construction projects. COSTI is overseen by a multi-stakeholder group comprising of members drawn from Government, the parastatal oversight body, civil society, private sector representatives, and the media oversight body. COSTI has also recognised that promoting transparency in public construction will lead to reduction of corruption in publicly funded projects.

9. APPENDIX 2: Key factors that influenced decision of stakeholders to participate in their respective collective action organizations

Public Sector

1. Capacity enhancement
2. Knowledge sharing/exchange
3. Networking
4. Belief in joint efforts
5. Part of mandate:
 - Felt we had a role to play
 - Make a contribution
 - Because we are responsible for the rule of law
6. Interest in governance issues
7. Advance anti-corruption stand in our sector
8. Promote transparency in construction sector
9. Make information available to the public
10. Get information to enable/improve oversight role
11. Get something for the constituency I represent

Civil Society Organizations

1. What the collective action was pushing for is something we have been involved in for long time
2. To influence governance and public policy
3. Platform for policy linkages
4. Interest in transparency and fighting corruption

5. Provide coordination for civil society organizations in fighting corruption
6. To enhance integrity

Private Sector

1. Networking
2. Business opportunities
3. The fact that construction sector was dogged with corruption and mismanagement
4. Convergence with the overall aim of our grouping
5. Recognition of how corruption was impacting business

Why anticipation of incentives influenced collective action

Public Sector

1. The nature of composition required our participation
2. The benefit of capacity enhancement and how it would help us fulfil our mandate
3. Contribute to national cause and also network with other organizations
4. Participation would address knowledge gap in seriousness of wildlife crime
5. Decision to contribute by being part of the collective action organization

Civil Society Organizations

1. Wanted to contribute to building society with integrity
2. Believed collective action organization was helping lay foundation for corruption free nation
3. Participation would help us effectively coordinate anti-corruption work in civil society organizations
4. Advancing shared purpose from different stakeholders
5. Collective action organization provided network opportunities, hence sharing knowledge, skills
6. It would help us achieve our objective of influencing public policy and provide coordination for civil society organization effort
7. Contribute our experience which we have accumulated over many years to finding solutions

Private Sector

1. Participation helped further national anti-corruption goals
2. Initiative helped to provide checks and balances
3. Organizations would help us improve governance and fight corruption within the sector

Media

Networking, lobbying in collective action were critical to achieving our goals.

Evidence that benefits were realised

Public Sector

1. Paradigm shift in how judicial officers handle wildlife crimes cases
2. Capacity building done
3. Exposure done
4. Seizure of contrabands
5. Registered cases increased
6. Image of our organization is better
7. We have put in place policies to reinforce governance
8. Successful lobbying and passing of the Public Procurement Act
9. Knowledge has been gained/shared on the implications of corruption on construction and public resources
10. Information has been shared
11. Contributed to the national cause
12. Capacity building was provided to my organization

Civil Society Organizations

1. Review of Wildlife Act
2. We have contributed to achieving some milestones
3. We have taken part in scrutinizing public projects to ensure accountability and transparency
4. The initiative was participatory and inclusive
5. NIC coordinated production of two reports on its work, organized the national anti-corruption day annually over the period its existed

6. A lot of cross learning was facilitated
7. Coordinated civil society organizations response to corruption
8. Established and trained integrity committees
9. Established memorandum of understanding/working relationship with the Anti-Corruption Bureau

Private Sector

1. We have contributed business specific experiences
2. We have raised our anti-corruption profile
3. Some business opportunities were realised

However, the private sector representatives on the NIC said benefits were not entirely realised - funding issues, not enough commitment from the government.

Media

1. Facilitated adoption of anti-corruption strategies in media houses

However, on COSTI, the media said that benefits were not entirely realised.

10. APPENDIX 3: Questionnaires used in the study

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR KEY INFORMANTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE

Introduction

The following questionnaire has been prepared for a research study on how incentive structures influence participation of stakeholders in collective action organizations such as COSTI. The aim of the study is to establish whether incentive structures (*i.e., the benefits that are offered or which participants stand to gain by participating in a collective action initiative*) significantly influence such participation, and the extent to which incentives can explain success of collective action organizations. The research study is being done in partial fulfilment of the requirements of a Master's Degree in Anti-Corruption Studies with the International Anti-Corruption Academy, located near Vienna, Austria. The information you will provide will be treated with the strictest confidentiality. Your responses will be used for research purposes only and will not be attributed to you by name. Please provide your honest opinion on each of the questions.

Thank you for your cooperation.

1. Membership of COSTI is mainly by invitation and determination on who should be invited to become a member is based on, among other things, relevance of what the organization does and how it relates to COSTI issues. Based on your assessment and observation, having been close to this initiative, what other influential factors can you say induce the various organizations to participate in COSTI?

2. How do organizations benefit (whether directly or indirectly) by participating in COSTI?

3. Do you think active participation in COSTI is directly linked to such benefits?

Yes

No

4. Briefly explain your response to the question above.

5. What other benefits apart from those cited in your view could encourage even greater stakeholder participation in this initiative?

6. In your view, to what extent do benefits that stakeholder gain by participating in COSTI contribute to the success of COSTI?

To a great extent To some extent To a lesser extent

They don't contribute at all

B Provide an explanation to your answer above.

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE

Thank You for Your Cooperation

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STAKEHOLDERS IN THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE-MALAWI (COSTI-MALAWI)

INTRODUCTION

The following questionnaire has been prepared for a research study on how incentive structures influence participation of stakeholders in collective action organizations such as the COSTI-Malawi. The aim of the study is to establish whether incentive structures (*i.e., the benefits that are offered or which participants stand to gain by participating in a collective action initiative*) significantly influence such participation, and the extent to which incentives can explain success of collective action organizations. The research study is being done in partial fulfilment of the requirements of a Master's Degree in Anti-Corruption Studies with the International Anti-Corruption Academy, located near Vienna, Austria. The information you will provide will be treated with the strictest confidentiality. Your responses will be used for research purposes only and will not be attributed to you by name. Please provide your honest opinion on each of the questions.

Thank you for your cooperation.

1. How did your organization/group/sector join the COSTI-Malawi?

Applied to join

Was invited

2. What influenced your organization/group/sector to participate in the COSTI-Malawi?

3. How did your organization/group/sector expect to benefit (whether directly or indirectly) by participating in the COSTI-Malawi? (*Benefits in this context may include, for example, capacity building opportunities, opportunities for exposure, recognition/prestige, financial benefits, networking opportunities, contribution to a national cause, etc.*)

B Was the anticipation of these benefits one of the key factors that influenced the decision by your organization/group/sector to participate in the COSTI-Malawi?

Yes

No

C If YES, please explain why?

4. If your organization/group/sector expected to benefit, at what stage of its participation in the COSTI-Malawi did it expect to realise these benefits:

During its participation in the COSTI At the end of the COSTI

Other (Please clarify)

5. Did the organizers of the COSTI-Malawi explain how your organization/groups/sector would benefit by participating in this initiative?

B If Yes, at what stage was this done?

C If NO, how, if at all, did they encourage your participation in the COSTI-Malawi?

D Were these benefits accessible to all the organizations/groups/sectors who were participating in the COSTI-Malawi?

To all members

To some members

6. Were these benefits realised at any stage in the COSTI-Malawi?

Yes

No

B If your answer is Yes, explain how?

7. Which of the following best describes your organization/group/sector participation in the COSTI-Malawi

Very active Occasional participant Inactive

B If you were very active, what factors influenced this level of participation?

8. In your view, is the COSTI-Malawi succeeding or failing?

It is succeeding It is failing Not sure

B How do you reach that assessment?

C What are the main factors explaining its success?

D What are the main factors explaining its failure?

9. In your view, to what extent would you say the benefits which organization/groups/sector who participate in the COSTI-Malawi gain contribute to the sustainability of the COSTI-Malawi?

To a great extent To some extent To a very little extent

They didn't contribute at all

B Please explain the reason for your conclusion

10. What challenges does the COSTI-Malawi meet?

11. What would you say are some of the lessons learnt from the COSTI-Malawi regarding implementation of multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the COSTI-Malawi?

12. What are some of the recommendations you can make that would make the COSTI-Malawi or similar initiative to be a success?

13. Do you have any additional comments?

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE
Thank You for Your Cooperation

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE ORGANIZERS OF THE BUSINESS ACTION AGAINST CORRUPTION

INTRODUCTION

The following questionnaire has been prepared for a research study on how incentive structures influence participation of stakeholders in collective action organizations such as Business Action Against Corruption (BAAC). The aim of the study is to establish whether incentive structures (*i.e., the benefits that are offered or which participants stand to gain by participating in a collective action initiative*), significantly influence such participation, and the extent to which incentives can explain success of collective action organizations. The research study is being done in partial fulfilment of the requirements of a Master’s Degree in Anti-Corruption Studies with the International Anti-Corruption Academy, located near Vienna, Austria. The information you will provide will be treated with the strictest confidentiality. Your responses will be used for research purposes only and will not be attributed to you by name. Please provide your honest opinion on each of the questions.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Part A: Background Information about BAAC

1. Briefly explain the origins of BAAC.

2. What was the motivation for launching BAAC?

3. What were the objectives of BAAC?

4. What kind of activities were done to achieve the objectives of BAAC you have mentioned?

5. How long was BAAC planned to run?

6. Who was targeted to participate in BAAC?

7. How were they identified?

8. Why were they targeted?

Part B: Management of BAAC and Incentives Structure

9. How was BAAC being managed?

10. How was BAAC being supported? (financial and other support)

11. What benefits (these could be either material or non-material, tangible or intangible benefits) do stakeholders who participated in BAAC stand to gain?

B Were these benefits available to every stakeholder who participated in BAAC?

Yes No

C If your answer to the above question was No, please explain the changes.

D Were these benefits explained to stakeholders who participated in BAAC?

Yes No

E If your answer to the above question was No, please explain why?

12. Did the range or type of benefits change over the course of BAAC?

Yes

No

B If your answer to the above question was Yes, please explain.

13. In your analysis, which of these statements best described BAAC?

- The benefits which stakeholders gained as participating organizations or sectors influenced active participation
- The benefits which stakeholders gained as participating organizations or sectors did not have any influence in active participation
- A lack of benefits which participating organizations or sectors could gain by from the initiative results in low participation
- Failure by the organizers to fulfil promised benefits result in low participation

Part C: Assessment of the Performance of BAAC

14. How long did BAAC last?

15. Were the objectives for BAAC met?

Yes

No

B In what way?

C What factors would you attribute this to?

16. Did participation of the members in BAAC remained consistently active?

17. What criteria was used to evaluate achievement of the objectives for BAAC?

18. As a coordinating agency for BAAC:

A Do you think benefits offered to members in BAAC were a key factor in the achievement of objectives for BAAC?

Yes

No

Explain your answer to the above question

C Would you say benefits contributed to the sustainability of the BAAC?

Yes

No

D Explain your answer to the above questions.

19. What challenges did BAAC meet?

20. What were some of the lessons learnt from these?

21. Do you have any additional comments?

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE
Thank You for Your Cooperation



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